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6. But though this be a state of liberty, yet it is not a state of licence: though man in that state have
an uncontrollable liberty to dispose of his person or possessions, yet he has not liberty to destroy himself,
or so much as any creature in his possession, but where some nobler use than its bare preservation calls
for it. The state of nature has a law of nature to govern it, which obliges every one, and reason, which
is that law, teaches all mankind, who will but consult it, that being all equal and independent, no one
ought to harm another in his life, health, liberty, or possessions: for men being all the workmanship
of one omnipotent, and infinitely wise maker; all the servants of one sovereign master, sent into the
world by his order, and about his business; they are his property, whose workmanship they are, made to
last during his, not one another’s pleasure: and being furnished with like faculties, sharing all in one
community of nature, there cannot be supposed any such subordination among us, that may authorize us to
destroy one another, as if we were made for one another’s uses, as the inferior ranks of creatures are
for ours. Every one, as he is bound to preserve himself, and not to quit his station wilfully, so by the
like reason, when his own preservation comes not in competition, ought he as much as he can to preserve
the rest of mankind, and not unless it be to do justice on an offender, take away, or impair the life,
or what tends to the preservation of the life, the liberty, health, limb or goods of another.
7. And that all men may be restrained from invading others’ rights, and from doing hurt to one another,
and the law of nature be observed, which willeth the peace and preservation of all mankind, the execution
of the law of nature is, in that state, put into every man’s hands, whereby every one has a right to punish
the transgressors of that law to such a degree, as may hinder its violation. For the law of nature would,
as all other laws that concern men in this world, be in vain, if there were nobody that in the state of
nature had a power to execute that law, and thereby preserve the innocent and restrain offenders. And
if any one in the state of nature may punish another for any evil he has done, every one may do so: for
in that state of perfect equality where naturally there is no superiority or jurisdiction of one over
another, what any may do in prosecution of that law, every one must needs have a right to do.
8. And thus, in the state of nature, one man comes by a power over another; but yet no absolute or arbitrary
power, to use a criminal, when he has got him in his hands, according to the passionate heats, or boundless
extravagancy of his own will; but only to retribute to him, so far as calm reason and conscience dictates,
what is proportionate to his transgression, which is so much as may serve for reparation and restraint:
for these two are the only reasons why one man may lawfully do harm to another, which is that we call
punishment. In transgressing the law of nature, the offender declares himself to live by another rule
than that of reason and common equity, which is that measure God has set to the actions of men for their
mutual security, and so he becomes dangerous to mankind, the tie, which is to secure them from injury
and violence, being slighted and broken by him, which being a trespass against the whole species, and
the peace and safety of it, provided for by the law of nature, every man upon this score, by the right
he hath to preserve mankind in general, may restrain, or where it is necessary, destroy things noxious
to them, and so may bring such evil on any one, who hath transgressed that law, as may make him repent
the doing of it, and thereby deter him, and, by his example others, from doing the like mischief. And
in this case, and upon this ground, every man hath a right to punish the offender, and be executioner
of the law of nature.
13. To this strange doctrine, viz. That in the state of nature every one has the executive power
of the law of nature, I doubt not but it will be objected, that it is unreasonable for men to be judges
in their own cases, that self-love will make men partial to themselves and their friends: and on the other
side, ill-nature, passion and revenge will carry them too far in punishing others; and hence nothing but
confusion and disorder will follow; and that therefore God hath certainly appointed government to restrain
the partiality and violence of men.
34. God gave the world to men in common, but since he gave it them for their benefit and the greatest
conveniences of life they were capable to draw from it, it cannot be supposed he meant it should always
remain common and uncultivated. He gave it to the use of the industrious and rational (and labour was
to be his title to it); not to the fancy or covetousness of the quarrelsome and contentious. He that had
as good left for his improvement as was already taken up needed not complain, ought not to meddle with
what was already improved by another’s labour; if he did ’tis plain he desired the benefit of another’s
pains, which he had no right to, and not the ground which God had given him, in common with others, to
labour on, and whereof there was as good left as that already possessed, and more than he knew what to
do with, or his industry could reach to.
35. ’Tis true, in land that is common in England or any other country, where there are plenty of people
under government who have money and commerce, no one can enclose or appropriate any part without the consent
of all his fellowcommoners; because this is left common by compact, i.e., by the law of the land, which
is not to be violated. And, though it be common in respect of some men, it is not so to all mankind, but
is the joint property of this country, or this parish. Besides, the remainder, after such enclosure, would
not be as good to the rest of the commoners as the whole was, when they could all make use of the whole;
whereas in the beginning and first peopling of the great common of the world it was quite otherwise. The
law man was under was rather for appropriating. God commanded, and his wants forced him to labour. That
was his property, which could not be taken from him wherever he had fixed it. And hence subduing or cultivating
the earth and having dominion, we see, are joined together. The one gave title to the other. So that God,
by commanding to subdue, gave authority so far to appropriate. And the condition of human life, which
requires labour and materials to work on, necessarily introduces private possessions.
36. The measure of property nature was well set by the extent of men’s labour and the conveniency of life.
No man’s labour could subdue or appropriate all, nor could his enjoyment consume more than a small part;
so that it was impossible for any man, this way, to entrench upon the right of another or acquire to himself
a property to the prejudice of his neighbour, who would still have room for as good and as large a possession
(after the other had taken out his) as before it was appropriated. Which measure did confine every man’s
possession to a very moderate proportion, and such as he might appropriate to himself without injury to
any body in the first ages of the world, when men were more in danger to be lost, by wandering from their
company, in the then vast wilderness of the earth, than to be straitened for want of room to plant in.
And the same measure may be allowed still, without prejudice to any body, as full as the world seems.
For, supposing a man or family, in the state they were at first, peopling of the world by the children
of Adam or Noah; let him plant in some inland vacant places of America, we shall find that the possessions
he could make himself, upon the measures we have given, would not be very large, nor, even to this day,
prejudice the rest of mankind or give them reason to complain or think themselves injured by this man’s
encroachment, though the race of men have now spread themselves to all corners of the world, and do infinitely
exceed what the small number was at the beginning. Nay, the extent of ground is of so little value without
labour that I have heard it affirmed that in Spain itself a man may be permitted to plough, sow, and reap,
without being disturbed, upon land he has no other title to, but only his making use of it. But, on the
contrary, the inhabitants think themselves beholden to him who, by his industry on neglected, and consequently
waste land, has increased the stock of corn, which they wanted. But be this as it will, which I lay no
stress on, this I dare boldly affirm, that the same rule of propriety (viz.), that every man should
have as much as he could make use of, would hold still in the world, without straitening any body, since
there is land enough in the world to suffice double the inhabitants, had not the invention of money, and
the tacit agreement of men to put a value on it, introduced (by consent) larger possessions and a right
to them; which, how it has done, I shall by and by shew more at large.
37. This is certain, that in the beginning, before the desire of having more than man needed had altered
the intrinsic value of things, which depends only on their usefulness to the life of man, or had agreed
that a little piece of yellow metal, which would keep without wasting or decay, should be worth a great
piece of flesh or a whole heap of corn, though men had a right to appropriate by their labour, each one
to himself, as much of the things of nature as he could use, yet this could not be much, nor to the prejudice
of others, where the same plenty was still left, to those who would use the same industry.
Before the appropriation of land, he who gathered as much of the wild fruit, killed, caught, or tamed
as many of the beasts as he could—he that so employed his pains about any of the spontaneous products
of nature as any way to alter them from the state nature put them in, by placing any of his labour on
them, did thereby acquire a propriety in them; but if they perished in his possession without their due
use—if the fruits rotted or the venison putrified before he could spend it, he offended against the common
law of nature, and was liable to be punished: he invaded his neighbour’s share for he had no right farther
than his use called for any of them, and they might serve to afford him conveniences of life.
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