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BROWN I
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WARREN delivered the opinion of the Court.
These cases come to us from the States of Kansas, South Carolina, Virginia, and Delaware. They are premised
on different facts and different local conditions, but a common legal question justifies their consideration
together in this consolidated opinion.
In each of the cases, minors of the Negro race, through their legal representatives, seek the aid of the
courts in obtaining admission to the public schools of their community on a nonsegregated basis. In each
instance, they had been denied admission to schools attended by white children under laws requiring or
permitting segregation according to race. This segregation was alleged to deprive the plaintiffs of the
equal protection of the laws under the Fourteenth Amendment. In each of the cases other than the Delaware
case, a three-judge federal district court denied relief to the plaintiffs on the so-called "separate
but equal" doctrine announced by this Court in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537. Under
that doctrine, equality of treatment is accorded when the races are provided substantially equal facilities,
even though these facilities be separate. In the Delaware case, the Supreme Court of Delaware adhered
to that doctrine, but ordered that the plaintiffs be admitted to the white schools because of their superiority
to the Negro schools.
The plaintiffs contend that segregated public schools are not "equal" and cannot be made "equal,"
and that hence they are deprived of the equal protection of the laws. Because of the obvious importance
of the question presented, the Court took jurisdiction. Argument was heard in the 1952 Term, and reargument
was heard this Term on certain questions propounded by the Court.
Reargument was largely devoted to the circumstances surrounding the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment
in 1868. It covered exhaustively consideration of the Amendment in Congress, ratification by the states,
then-existing practices in racial segregation, and the views of proponents and opponents of the Amendment.
This discussion and our own investigation convince us that, although these sources cast some light, it
is not enough to resolve the problem with which we are faced. At best, they are inconclusive. The most
avid proponents of the post-War Amendments undoubtedly intended them to remove all legal distinctions
among "all persons born or naturalized in the United States." Their opponents, just as certainly,
were antagonistic to both the letter and the spirit of the Amendments and wished them to have the most
limited effect. What others in Congress and the state legislatures had in mind cannot be determined with
any degree of certainty.
An additional reason for the inconclusive nature of the Amendment’s history, with respect to segregated
schools, is the status of public education at that time. In the South, the movement toward free common
schools, supported by general taxation, had not yet taken hold. Education of white children was largely
in the hands of private groups. Education of Negroes was almost nonexistent, and practically all of the
race were illiterate. In fact, any education of Negroes was forbidden by law in some states. Today, in
contrast, many Negroes have achieved outstanding success in the arts and sciences as well as in the business
and professional world. It is true that public school education at the time of the Amendment had advanced
further in the North, but the effect of the Amendment on Northern States was generally ignored in the
congressional debates. Even in the North, the conditions of public education did not approximate those
existing today. The curriculum was usually rudimentary; ungraded schools were common in rural areas; the
school term was but three months a year in many states; and compulsory school attendance was virtually
unknown. As a consequence, it is not surprising that there should be so little in the history of the Fourteenth
Amendment relating to its intended effect on public education.
In the first cases in this Court construing the Fourteenth Amendment, decided shortly after its adoption,
the Court interpreted it as proscribing all state-imposed discriminations against the Negro race. The
doctrine of "separate but equal" did not make its appearance in this Court until 1896 in the
case of Plessy v. Ferguson, supra, involving not education but transportation. American
courts have since labored with the doctrine for over half a century. In this Court, there have been six
cases involving the "separate but equal" doctrine in the field of public education. In Cumming
v. County Board of Education . . . and Gong Lum v. Rice . . . the validity of
the doctrine itself was not challenged. In more recent cases, all on the graduate school level, inequality
was found in that specific benefits en-joyed by white students were denied to Negro students of the same
educational qualifications. Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, . . . Sipuel v. Oklahoma,
. . . Sweatt v. Painter, . . . McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents. . . . In none of
these cases was it necessary to re-examine the doctrine to grant relief to the Negro plaintiff. And in
Sweatt v. Painter, supra, the Court expressly reserved decision on the question whether
Plessy v. Ferguson should be held inapplicable to public education.
In the instant cases, that question is directly presented. Here, unlike Sweatt v. Painter, there
are findings below that the Negro and white schools involved have been equalized, or are being equalized,
with respect to buildings, curricula, qualifications and salaries of teachers, and other "tangible"
factors. Our decision, therefore, cannot turn on merely a comparison of these tangible factors in the
Negro and white schools involved in each of the cases. We must look instead to the effect of segregation
itself on public education.
In approaching this problem, we cannot turn the clock back to 1868 when the Amendment was adopted, or
even to 1896 when Plessy v. Ferguson was written. We must consider public education in the
light of its full development and its present place in American life throughout the Nation. Only in this
way can it be determined if segregation in public schools deprives these plaintiffs of the equal protection
of the laws.
Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state and local governments. Compulsory school
attendance laws and the great expenditures for education both demonstrate our recognition of the importance
of education to our democratic society. It is required in the performance of our most basic public responsibilities,
even service in the armed forces. It is the very foundation of good citizenship. Today it is a principal
instrument in awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing him for later professional training,
and in helping him to adjust normally to his environment. In these days, it is doubtful that any child
may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an education. Such an
opportunity, where the state has undertaken to provide it, is a right which must be made available to
all on equal terms.
We come then to the question presented: Does segregation of children in public schools solely on the basis
of race, even though the physical facilities and other "tangible" factors may be equal, deprive
the children of the minority group of equal educational opportunities? We believe that it does.
In Sweatt v. Painter, supra, in finding that a segregated law school for Negroes could not
provide them equal educational opportunities, this Court relied in large part on "those qualities
which are incapable of objective measurement but which make for greatness in a law school." In McLaurin
v. Oklahoma State Regents, supra, the Court, in requiring that a Negro admitted to a white
graduate school be treated like all other students, again resorted to intangible considerations: ".
. . his ability to study, to engage in discussions and exchange views with other students, and, in general,
to learn his profession." Such considerations apply with added force to children in grade and high
schools. To separate them from others of similar age and qualifications solely because of their race generates
a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community that may affect their hearts and minds in
a way unlikely ever to be undone. The effect of this separation on the educational opportunities was well
stated by a finding in the Kansas case by a court which nevertheless felt compelled to rule against the
Negro plaintiffs:
Segregation of white and colored children in public schools has a detrimental effect upon the colored
children. The impact is greater when it has the sanction of the law; for the policy of separating the
races is usually interpreted as denoting the inferiority of the negro group. A sense of inferiority affects
the motivation of the child to learn. Segregation with the sanction of law, therefore, has a tendency
to [retard] the educational and mental development of Negro children and to deprive them of some of the
benefits they would receive in a racial[ly] integrated school system.
Whatever may have been the extent of psychological knowledge at the time of Plessy v. Ferguson,
this finding is amply supported by modern authority.* Any language in Plessy v. Ferguson contrary
to this finding is rejected.
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