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The House Feb. 10 passed, by a 290–130 roll-call vote, and sent to the Senate an amended version of
HR 7152, the bipartisan civil rights bill. (For voting, see chart p. 334) No major amendments were made
to the bill, the most sweeping civil rights measure to clear either house of Congress in the 20th Century.
It covered voting rights, discrimination in public accommodations, facilities, employment and federally
assisted programs, empowered the Attorney General to instigate school desegregation suits and intervene
in other civil rights cases, set up a conciliation service and extended the Civil Rights Commission.
Debate took nine days between Jan. 31 and Feb. 10. (For Jan. 31–Feb. 5 action, see Weekly Report p. 250)
Of the 256 House Democrats, 152 (59 percent) voted in favor of the bill and 96 against. Northern Democrats
supported it 141–4. The exceptions; Lesinski (Mich.), Hull (Mo.), Jones (Mo.) and Baring (Nev.). Southern
Democrats opposed the bill 11–92. The exceptions: Pepper (Fla.), Perkins (Ky.), Albert, Edmondson and
Steed (Okla.), Bass and Fulton (Tenn.), Brooks, Gonzalez, Pickle and Thomas (Texas).
Of the 177 Republicans, 138 (78 percent) voted for the bill and 34 against. The 34 Republican opponents
included all 12 Southern Republicans plus Rhodes (Ariz.), Martin, Utt, Clawson, Lipscomb and Smith (Calif.),
Gross and Jensen (Iowa), Hutchinson, Johansen, Knox and Meader (Mich.), Hall (Mo.), Battin (Mont.), Beermann
(Neb.), Wyman (N.H.), Kilburn (N.Y.), Short (N.D.), Ashbrook (Ohio), Berry (S.D.), Van Pelt (Wis.) and
Harrison (Wyo.).
Campaign for Passage
The bipartisan coalition of Republicans and Northern Democrats which negotiated the provisions of HR 7152
in the Judiciary Committee in 1963 held firm against any major changes despite a barrage of amendments.
Not a single amendment opposed by the bill’s managers was adopted.
A major factor in holding supporters in line on key amendments was the carefully formulated campaign of
the major legislative and lobby groups behind the bill—the Democratic Study Group, the Leadership Conference
on Civil Rights, major Negro rights organizations, top industrial unions of the AFL-CIO, Protestant, Catholic
and Jewish church groups, the White House, the Justice Department and groupings of pro-civil rights Republicans.
By contrast, the Southern Democrats appeared to enter the battle with minimal organization and little
gusto for the fight. At no time during the debate did the Southerners demonstrate the indignation that
marked their 1963 struggle against a much lesser bill, the measure extending the Civil Rights Commission
for a single year. Nor did they use delaying tactics—in return for which few restrictions were placed
by the majority on the length of debate.
The Southerners repeatedly expressed concern about the cohesiveness of the bipartisan coalition working
in behalf of the bill. "It is unfortunate that we see an agreement between the Republican leadership
over here and the Democratic leadership over there to pass through this House every last bad provision
that is in this bill, of which there are hundreds," Rep. Jamie L. Whitten (D Miss.) said Feb. 5.
(The next CQ Weekly Report will carry a full report on the lobbying and legislative strategy of both sides.)
In all, 122 amendments, applying to all of the bill’s titles, were disposed of during debate on the bill.
Of these, 28 were accepted, most of them technical in nature but a few of some significance.
One amendment restricted somewhat the 14th Amendment application of the public accommodations section;
another cut back the life of the Civil Rights Commission from a permanent extension to four years; another
required 30 days’ notice to Congress before administrative agencies could cut off federal funds from programs
practicing discrimination. Two amendments tended to widen the scope of the bill, one of them adding discrimination
in employment because of sex to the list of prohibited practices and another reinstating the provision
for a Community Relations Service included in the original Administration bill but dropped in Committee.
Ninety-four amendments were rejected, many of them Southern attempts to weaken the bill.
Threats to Coalition
Only two incidents threatened to disturb the firm coalition between the Northern Democrats and Republicans.
The first occurred Feb. 7 when Rep. Oren Harris (D Ark.) offered an amendment to cut back Title VI, the
section requiring an end to discrimination in all federally financed programs. Harris proposed substitution
of an earlier, discretionary title suggested but then discarded as too weak by the Kennedy Administration.
Republicans backing the bill became alarmed when House Democratic Whip Hale Boggs (La.) rose to support
the Harris amendment, saying it would be "a far cry from the granting of sweeping authority (to cut
off federal funds) contained in Title VI." No Republicans had been informed that Harris would offer
his amendment or that Boggs, a member of the Democratic House leadership, would support it.
Most Republican leaders were off the floor in a strategy session when Boggs spoke but Rep. John V. Lindsay
(R N.Y.) was present and rose to suggest that the Harris amendment was "the biggest mousetrap that
has been offered since the debate on this bill began." Lindsay charged the amendment would "gut"
an important title. "I am appalled that this is being supported in the well of the House by the Majority
Whip. . . . Does this mean there is a cave-in in this important title?"
Senate Accommodations Bill
The Senate Commerce Committee Feb. 10 reported the public accommodations bill (S 1732–S Rept 872) it had
approved on Oct. 8, 1963. S 1732 forbids discrimination in essentially the same accommodations enumerated
in Title II of the House bill but is based exclusively on the commerce clause, with no reference to the
14th Amendment. The bill also bars discrimination in labor unions or professional, business or trade associations
where membership affects an individual’s ability to deal in interstate commerce. Power given the Attorney
General to instigate suits and the bill’s enforcement procedures, including jury trials in criminal contempt
cases, parallel House provisions.
Individual views were filed by Sens. A. S. Mike Monroney (D Okla.), who said the bill should be limited
to establishments catering primarily to interstate trade, Strom Thurmond (D S.C.), who opposed any federal
action in the field, Norris Cotton (R N.H.), who favored a more limited bill based exclusively on the
14th Amendment, and Winston L., Prouty (R Vt.), who insisted that the 13th and 14th Amendments could and
should be used as the basis of comprehensive public accommodations legislation. "Man is not an article
of commerce" and should not be treated so by the legislation, Prouty said.
Rep. James Roosevelt (D Calif.) answered that there was no "cave-in." McCulloch, after hastily
conferring with Celler, took a microphone to announce that if the amendment passed, "I regret to
say that my individual support of the legislation will come to an end." Celler then announced he
was "unalterably opposed to the amendment" and it was rejected, 80-206, on a teller vote. Later,
though Boggs—Congressman from New Orleans—denied he had been speaking for anyone but himself in backing
the Harris amendment, suspicious Republicans said his move might have been the first in a possible series
of maneuvers to weaken the bill so that it could escape an all-out Southern filibuster in the Senate.
McCulloch had repeatedly assured House Republicans that he would not ask them to "walk the plank"
by voting for highly controversial public accommodations, fair employment and federal funds titles of
the bill—and then see these provisions "traded away" in the Senate. McCulloch Jan. 15 had said
in testimony before the Rules Committee that "my head is still bloodied from that battle in 1957"
when House Republicans, with his support, voted for a strong "Title III" authority only to see
it removed in the Senate. He said he would "not be a party" to a repeat performance in 1964.
After passage of the bill House Republican sources made it clear that if the Senate deleted controversial
titles from the bill, McCulloch and other influential House Republicans might withdraw their support of
the measure, thus jeopardizing final approval. The apparent reasoning was that the Administration could
not take the political risk of having no bill at all passed, and thus would use its influence to prevent
any major weakening of the bill in the Senate.
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