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November 22, 1787
To the People of the State of New York: Among the numerous advantages promised by a well constructed
Union, none deserves to be more accurately developed than its tendency to break and control the violence
of faction. The friend of popular governments, never finds himself so much alarmed for their character
and fate, as when he contemplates their propensity to this dangerous vice. He will not fail therefore
to set a due value on any plan which, without violating the principles to which he is attached, provides
a proper cure for it. The instability, injustice and confusion introduced into the public councils, have
in truth been the mortal diseases under which popular governments have every where perished; as they continue
to be the favorite and fruitful topics from which the adversaries to liberty derive their most specious
declamations. The valuable improvements made by the American constitutions on the popular models, both
ancient and modern, cannot certainly be too much admired; but it would be an unwarrantable partiality,
to contend that they have as effectually obviated the danger on this side as was wished and expected.
Complaints are every where heard from our most considerate and virtuous citizens, equally the friends
of public and private faith, and of public and personal liberty; that our governments are too unstable;
that the public good is disregarded in the conflicts of rival parties; and that measures are too often
decided, not according to the rules of justice, and the rights of the minor party; but by the superior
force of an interested and over-bearing majority. However anxiously we may wish that these complaints
had no foundation, the evidence of known facts will not permit us to deny that they are in some degree
true. It will be found indeed, on a candid review of our situation, that some of the distresses under
which we labor, have been erroneously charged on the operation of our governments; but it will be found,
at the same time, that other causes will not alone account for many of our heaviest misfortunes; and particularly,
for that prevailing and increasing distrust of public engagements, and alarm for private rights, which
are echoed from one end of the continent to the other. These must be chiefly, if not wholly, effects of
the unsteadiness and injustice, with which a factious spirit has tainted our public administrations.
By a faction I understand a number of citizens, whether amounting to a majority or minority of the whole,
who are united and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights of
other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the community.
There are two methods of curing the mischiefs of faction: the one, by removing its causes; the other,
by controlling its effects.
There are again two methods of removing the causes of faction: the one by destroying the liberty which
is essential to its existence; the other, by giving to every citizen the same opinions, the same passions,
and the same interests.
It could never be more truly said than of the first remedy, that it is worse than the disease. Liberty
is to faction, what air is to fire, an ailment without which it instantly expires. But it could not be
a less folly to abolish liberty, which is essential to political life, because it nourishes faction, than
it would be to wish the annihilation of air, which is essential to animal life, because it imparts to
fire its destructive agency.
The second expedient is as impracticable, as the first would be unwise. As long as the reason of man continues
fallible, and he is at liberty to exercise it, different opinions will be formed. As long as the connection
subsists between his reason and his self-love, his opinions and his passions will have a reciprocal influence
on each other; and the former will be objects to which the latter will attach themselves. The diversity
in the faculties of men from which the rights of property originate, is not less an insuperable obstacle
to a uniformity of interests. The protection of these faculties is the first object of Government. From
the protection of different and unequal faculties of acquiring property, the possession of different degrees
and kinds of property immediately results: and from the influence of these on the sentiments and views
of the respective proprietors, ensues a division of the society into different interests and parties.
The latent causes of faction are thus sown in the nature of man; and we see them every where brought into
different degrees of activity, according to the different circumstances of civil society. A zeal for different
opinions concerning religion, concerning Government and many other points, as well of speculation as of
practice; an attachment to different leaders ambitiously contending for pre-eminence and power; or to
persons of other descriptions whose fortunes have been interesting to the human passions, have in turn
divided mankind into parties, inflamed them with mutual animosity, and rendered them much more disposed
to vex and oppress each other, than to co-operate for their common good. So strong is this propensity
of mankind to fall into mutual animosities, that where no substantial occasion presents itself, the most
frivolous and fanciful distinctions have been sufficient to kindle their unfriendly passions, and excite
their most violent conflicts. But the most common and durable source of factions, has been the various
and unequal distribution of property. Those who hold, and those who are without property, have ever formed
distinct interests in society. Those who are creditors, and those who are debtors, fall under a like discrimination.
A landed interest, a manufacturing interest, a mercantile interest, a monied interest, with many lesser
interests, grow up of necessity in civilized nations, and divide them into different classes, actuated
by different sentiments and views. The regulation of these various and interfering interests forms the
principal task of modern Legislation, and involves the spirit of party and faction in the necessary and
ordinary operations of Government.
No man is allowed to be a judge in his own cause; because his interest would certainly bias his judgment,
and, not improbably, corrupt his integrity. With equal, nay with greater reason, a body of men, are unfit
to be both judges and parties, at the same time; yet, what are many of the most important acts of legislation,
but so many judicial determinations, not indeed concerning the rights of single persons, but concerning
the rights of large bodies of citizens; and what are the different classes of legislators, but advocates
and parties to the causes which they determine? Is a law proposed concerning private debts? It is a question
to which the creditors are parties on one side, and the debtors on the other. Justice ought to hold the
balance between them. Yet the parties are and must be themselves the judges; and the most numerous party,
or, in other words the most powerful faction must be expected to prevail. Shall domestic manufactures
be encouraged, and in what degree, by restrictions on foreign manufactures? are questions which would
be differently decided by the landed and the manufacturing classes; and probably by neither, with a sole
regard to justice and the public good. The apportionment of taxes on the various descriptions of property,
is an act which seems to require the most exact impartiality; yet, there is perhaps no legislative act
in which greater opportunity and temptation are given to a predominant party, to trample on the rules
of justice. Every shilling with which they over-burden the inferior number, is a shilling saved to their
own pockets.
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