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It is in vain to say, that enlightened statesmen will be able to adjust these clashing interests,
and render them all subservient to the public good. Enlightened statesmen will not always be at the helm.
Nor, in many cases, can such an adjustment be made at all, without taking into view indirect and remote
considerations, which will rarely prevail over the immediate interest which one party may find in disregarding
the rights of another, or the good of the whole.
The inference to which we are brought, is, that the causes of faction cannot be removed; and that
relief is only to be sought in the means of controlling its effects.
If a faction consists of less than a majority, relief is supplied by the republican principle, which enables
the majority to defeat its sinister views by regular vote: It may clog the administration, it may convulse
the society; but it will be unable to execute and mask its violence under the forms of the Constitution.
When a majority is included in a faction, the form of popular government on the other hand enables it
to sacrifice to its ruling passion or interest, both the public good and the rights of other citizens.
To secure the public good, and private rights, against the danger of such a faction, and at the same time
to preserve the spirit and the form of popular government, is then the great object to which our enquiries
are directed: Let me add that it is the great desideratum, by which alone this form of government can
be rescued from the opprobrium under which it has so long labored, and be recommended to the esteem and
adoption of mankind.
By what means is this object attainable? Evidently by one of two only. Either the existence of the same
passion or interest in a majority at the same time, must be prevented; or the majority, having such coexistent
passion or interest, must be tendered, by their number and local situation, unable to concert and carry
into effect schemes of oppression. If the impulse and the opportunity be suffered to coincide, we well
know that neither moral nor religious motives can be relied on as an adequate control. They are not found
to be such on the injustice and violence of individuals, and lose their efficacy in proportion to the
number combined together; that is, in proportion as their efficacy becomes needful.
From this view of the subject, it may be concluded that a pure Democracy, by which I mean, a Society,
consisting of a small number of citizens, who assemble and administer the Government in person, can admit
of no cure for the mischiefs of faction. A common passion or interest will, in almost every case, be felt
by a majority of the whole; a communication and concert results from the form of Government itself; and
there is nothing to check the inducements to sacrifice the weaker party, or an obnoxious individual. Hence
it is, that such Democracies have ever been spectacles of turbulence and contention; have ever been found
incompatible with personal security, or the rights of property; and have in general been as short in their
lives, as they have been violent in their deaths. Theoretic politicians, who have patronized this species
of Government, have erroneously supposed, that by reducing mankind to a perfect equality in their political
rights, they would, at the same time, be perfectly equalized and assimilated in their possessions, their
opinions, and their passions.
A Republic, by which I mean a Government in which the scheme of representation takes place, opens a different
prospect, and promises the cure for which we are seeking. Let us examine the points in which it varies
from pure Democracy, and we shall comprehend both the nature of the cure, and the efficacy which it must
derive from the Union.
The two great points of difference between a Democracy and a Republic are, first, the delegation of the
Government, in the latter, to a small number of citizens elected by the rest: secondly, the greater number
of citizens, and greater sphere of country, over which the latter may be extended.
The effect of the first difference is, on the one hand to refine and enlarge the public views, by passing
them through the medium of a chosen body of citizens, whose wisdom may best discern the true interest
of their country, and whose patriotism and love of justice, will be least likely to sacrifice it to temporary
or partial considerations. Under such a regulation, it may well happen that the public voice pronounced
by the representatives of the people, will be more consonant to the public good, than if pronounced by
the people themselves convened for the purpose. On the other hand, the effect may be inverted. Men of
factious tempers, of local prejudices, or of sinister designs, may by intrigue, by corruption or by other
means, first obtain the suffrages, and then betray the interests of the people. The question resulting
is, whether small or extensive Republics are most favorable to the election of proper guardians of the
public weal: and it is clearly decided in favor of the latter by two obvious considerations.
In the first place it is to be remarked that however small the Republic may be, the Representatives must
be raised to a certain number, in order to guard against the cabals of a few; and that however large it
may be, they must be limited to a certain number, in order to guard against the confusion of a multitude.
Hence the number of Representatives in the two cases, not being in proportion to that of the Constituents,
and being proportionally greatest in the small Republic, it follows, that if the propor- tion of fit characters,
be not less, in the large than in the small Republic, the former will present a greater option, and consequently
a greater probability of a fit choice.
In the next place, as each Representative will be chosen by a greater number of citizens in the large
than in the small Republic, it will be more difficult for unworthy candidates to practice with success
the vicious arts, by which elections are too often carried; and the suffrages of the people being more
free, will be more likely to center on men who possess the most attractive merit, and the most diffusive
and established characters.
It must be confessed, that in this, as in most other cases, there is a mean, on both sides of which inconveniences
will be found to lie. By enlarging too much the number of electors, you render the representative too
little acquainted with all their local circumstances and lesser interests; as by reducing it too much,
you render him unduly attached to these, and too little fit to comprehend and pursue great and national
objects. The Federal Constitution forms a happy combination in this respect; the great and aggregate interests
being referred to the national, the local and particular, to the state legislatures.
The other point of difference is, the greater number of citizens and extent of territory which may be
brought within the compass of Republican, than of Democratic Government; and it is this circumstance principally
which renders factious combinations less to be dreaded in the former, than in the latter. The smaller
the society, the fewer probably will be the distinct parties and interests composing it; the fewer the
distinct parties and interests, the more frequently will a majority be found of the same party; and the
smaller the number of individuals composing a majority, and the smaller the compass within which they
are placed, the more easily will they concert and execute their plans of oppression. Extend the sphere,
and you take in a greater variety of parties and interests; you make it less probable that a majority
of the whole will have a common motive to invade the rights of other citizens; or if such a common motive
exists, it will be more difficult for all who feel it to discover their own strength, and to act in unison
with each other. Besides other impediments, it may be remarked, that where there is a consciousness of
unjust or dishonorable purposes, communication is always checked by distrust, in proportion to the number
whose concurrence is necessary.
Hence it clearly appears, that the same advantage, which a Republic has over a Democracy, in controlling
the effects of faction, is enjoyed by a large over a small Republic—is enjoyed by the Union over the States
composing it. Does this advantage consist in the substitution of Representatives, whose enlightened views
and virtuous sentiments render them superior to local prejudices, and to schemes of injustice? It will
not be denied, that the Representation of the Union will be most likely to possess these requisite endowments.
Does it consist in the greater security afforded by a greater variety of parties, against the event of
any one part being able to outnumber and oppress the rest? In an equal degree does the increased variety
of parties, comprised within the Union, increase this security. Does it, in fine, consist in the greater
obstacles opposed to the concert and accomplishment of the secret wishes of an unjust and interested majority?
Here, again, the extent of the Union gives it the most palpable advantage.
The influence of factious leaders may kindle a flame within their particular States, but will be unable
to spread a general conflagration through the other States: a religious sect, may degenerate into a political
faction in a part of the Confederacy; but the variety of sects dispersed over the entire fact of it, must
secure the national Councils against any danger from that source: a rage for paper money, for an abolition
of debts, for an equal division of property, or for any other improper or wicked project, will be less
apt to pervade the whole body of the Union, than a particular member of it; in the same proportion as
such a malady is more likely to taint a particular county or district, than an entire State.
In the extent and proper structure of the Union, therefore, we behold a Republican remedy for the diseases
most incident to Republican Government. And according to the degree of pleasure and pride, we feel in
being Republicans, ought to be our zeal in cherishing the spirit, and supporting the character of Federalists.
PUBLIUS.
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