JUSTICE STEVENS delivered the opinion of the Court.
"No Person shall be a Representative who shall not have attained to the Age of twenty five Years,
and been seven Years a Citizen of the United States, and who shall not, when elected, be an Inhabitant
of that State in which he shall be chosen."
Article I, §3, cl. 3, which applies to the Senate, similarly provides:
"No Person shall be a Senator who shall not have attained to the Age of thirty Years, and been nine
Years a Citizen of the United States, and who shall not, when elected, be an Inhabitant of that State
for which he shall be chosen."
Today’s cases present a challenge to an amendment to the Arkansas State Constitution that prohibits the
name of an otherwise eligible candidate for Congress from appearing on the general election ballot if
that candidate has already served three terms in the House of Representatives or two terms in the Senate.
The Arkansas Supreme Court held that the amendment violates the Federal Constitution. We agree with that
holding. Such a state imposed restriction is contrary to the "fundamental principle of our representative
democracy," embodied in the Constitution, that "the people should choose whom they please to
govern them." Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 547 (1969) (internal quotation marks
omitted). Allowing individual States to adopt their own qualifications for congressional service would
be inconsistent with the Framers’ vision of a uniform National Legislature representing the people of
the United States. If the qualifications set forth in the text of the Constitution are to be changed,
that text must be amended.
At the general election on November 3, 1992, the voters of Arkansas adopted Amendment 73 to their State
Constitution. Proposed as a "Term Limitation Amendment," its preamble stated:
"The people of Arkansas find and declare that elected officials who remain in office too long become
preoccupied with reelection and ignore their duties as representatives of the people. Entrenched incumbency
has reduced voter participation and has led to an electoral system that is less free, less competitive,
and less representative than the system established by the Founding Fathers. Therefore, the people of
Arkansas, exercising their reserved powers, herein limit the terms of the elected officials."
The limitations in Amendment 73 apply to three categories of elected officials. Section 1 provides that
no elected official in the executive branch of the state government may serve more than two 4 year terms.
Section 2 applies to the legislative branch of the state government; it provides that no member of the
Arkansas House of Representatives may serve more than three 2 year terms and no member of the Arkansas
Senate may serve more than two 4 year terms. Section 3, the provision at issue in these cases, applies
to the Arkansas Congressional Delegation. It provides:
"(a) Any person having been elected to three or more terms as a member of the United States House
of Representatives from Arkansas shall not be certified as a candidate and shall not be eligible to have
his/her name placed on the ballot for election to the United States House of Representatives from Arkansas.
"(b) Any person having been elected to two or more terms as a member of the United States Senate
from Arkansas shall not be certified as a candidate and shall not be eligible to have his/her name placed
on the ballot for election to the United States Senate from Arkansas."
Amendment 73 states that it is self executing and shall apply to all persons seeking election after January
1, 1993.
On November 13, 1992: respondent Bobbie Hill, on behalf of herself, similarly situated Arkansas "citizens,
residents, taxpayers and registered voters," and the League of Women Voters of Arkansas, filed a
complaint in the Circuit Court for Pulaski County, Arkansas, seeking a declaratory judgment that §3 of
Amendment 73 is "unconstitutional and void." Her complaint named as defendants then Governor
Clinton other state officers, the Republican Party of Arkansas, and the Democratic Party of Arkansas.
The State of Arkansas, through its Attorney General, petitioner Winston Bryant, intervened as a party
defendant in support of the amendment. Several proponents of the amendment also intervened, including
petitioner U.S. Term Limits, Inc.
On cross motions for summary judgment, the Circuit Court held that §3 of Amendment 73 violated Article
I of the Federal Constitution. . . .
512 U. S. (1994). We now affirm.
As the opinions of the Arkansas Supreme Court suggest, the constitutionality of Amendment 73 depends critically
on the resolution of two distinct issues. The first is whether the Constitution forbids States from adding
to or altering the qualifications specifically enumerated in the Constitution. The second is, if the Constitution
does so forbid, whether the fact that Amendment 73 is formulated as a ballot access restriction rather
than as an outright disqualification is of constitutional significance. Our resolution of these issues
draws upon our prior resolution of a related but distinct issue: whether Congress has the power to add
to or alter the qualifications of its Members.
Twenty six years ago, in Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969), we reviewed the history
and text of the Qualifications Clauses in a case involving an attempted exclusion of a duly elected Member
of Congress. The principal issue was whether the power granted to each House in Art. I, §5, to judge the
"Qualifications of its own Members" includes the power to impose qualifications other than those
set forth in the text of the Constitution. In an opinion by Chief Justice Warren for eight Members of
the Court, we held that it does not. Because of the obvious importance of the issue, the Court’s review
of the history and meaning of the relevant constitutional text was especially thorough. We therefore begin
our analysis today with a full statement of what we decided in that case.
THE ISSUE IN POWELL
In November 1966, Adam Clayton Powell, Jr., was elected from a District in New York to serve in the United
States House of Representatives for the 90th Congress. Allegations that he had engaged in serious misconduct
while serving as a committee chairman during the 89th Congress led to the appointment of a Select Committee
to determine his eligibility to take his seat. That Committee found that Powell met the age, citizenship,
and residency requirements set forth in Art. I, §2, cl. 2. The Committee also found, however, that Powell
had wrongfully diverted House funds for the use of others and himself and had made false reports on expenditures
of foreign currency. Based on those findings, the House after debate adopted House Resolution 278, excluding
Powell from membership in the House, and declared his seat vacant. See 395 U. S., at 489–493.
Powell and several voters of the District from which he had been elected filed suit seeking a declaratory
judgment that the House Resolution was invalid because Art. I, §2, cl. 2, sets forth the exclusive qualifications
for House membership. We ultimately accepted that contention, concluding that the House of Representatives
has no "authority to exclude any person, duly elected by his constituents, who meets all the
requirements for membership expressly prescribed in the Constitution." 395 U. S., at 522 (emphasis
in original); see also id., at 547. In reaching that conclusion, we undertook a detailed historical
review to determine the intent of the Framers. Though recognizing that the Constitutional Convention debates
themselves were inconclusive, see id., at 532, we determined that the "relevant historical
materials" reveal that Congress has no power to alter the qualifications in the text of the Constitution,
id., at 522. |
