To the People of the State of New York.
There is an idea, which is not without its advocates, that a vigorous executive is inconsistent with the
genius of republican government. The enlightened well wishers to this species of government must at least
hope that the supposition is destitute of foundation; since they can never admit its truth, without at
the same time admitting the condemnation of their own principles. Energy in the executive is a leading
character in the definition of good government. It is essential to the protection of the community against
foreign attacks: It is not less essential to the steady administration of the laws, to the protection
of property against those irregular and high handed combinations, which sometimes interrupt the ordinary
course of justice, to the security of liberty against the enterprises and assaults of ambition, of faction
and of anarchy. Every man the least conversant in Roman history knows how often that republic was obliged
to take refuge in the absolute power of a single man, under the formidable title of dictator, as well
against the intrigues of ambitious individuals, who aspired to the tyranny, and the seditions of whole
classes of the community, whose conduct threatened the existence of all government, as against the invasions
of external enemies, who menaced the conquest and destruction of Rome.
There can be no need however to multiply arguments or examples on this head. A feeble executive implies
a feeble execution of the government. A feeble execution is but another phrase for a bad execution: And
a government ill executed, whatever it may be in theory, must be in practice a bad government.
Taking it for granted, therefore, that all men of sense will agree in the necessity of an energetic executive;
it will only remain to inquire, what are the ingredients which constitute this energy—how far can they
be combined with those other ingredients which constitute safety in the republican sense? And how far
does this combination characterise the plan, which has been reported by the convention?
The ingredients, which constitute energy in the executive, are first unity, secondly duration, thirdly
an adequate provision for its support, fourthly competent powers.
The circumstances which constitute safety in the republican sense are, 1st. a due dependence on the people,
secondly a due responsibility. Those politicians and statesmen, who have been the most celebrated for
the soundness of their principles, and for the justness of their views, have declared in favor of a single
executive and a numerous legislature. They have with great propriety considered energy as the most necessary
qualification of the former, and have regarded this as most applicable to power in a single hand; while
they have with equal propriety considered the latter as best adapted to deliberation and wisdom, and best
calculated to conciliate the confidence of the people and to secure their privileges and interests.
That unity is conducive to energy will not be disputed. Decision, activity, secrecy, and dispatch will
generally characterise the proceedings of one man, in a much more eminent degree, than the proceedings
of any greater number; and in proportion as the number is increased, these qualities will be diminished.
This unity may be destroyed in two ways; either by vesting the power in two or more magistrates of equal
dignity and authority; or by vesting it ostensibly in one man, subject in whole or in part to the controul
and co-operation of others, in the capacity of counsellors to him. Of the first the two consuls of Rome
may serve as an example; of the last we shall find examples in the constitutions of several of the states.
New-York and New-Jersey, if I recollect right, are the only states, which have entrusted the executive
authority wholly to single men. Both these methods of destroying the unity of the executive have their
partisans; but the votaries of an executive council are the most numerous. They are both liable, if not
to equal, to similar objections; and may in most lights be examined in conjunction. . . . |
