On the merits, the District Court held that the cancellations did not conform to the constitutionally
mandated procedures for the enactment or repeal of laws in two respects. First, the laws that resulted
after the cancellations "were different from those consented to by both Houses of Congress."
Id., at 178. Moreover, the President violated Article I "when he unilaterally canceled provisions
of duly enacted statutes." Id., at 179. As a separate basis for its decision, the District
Court also held that the Act "impermissibly disrupts the balance of powers among the three branches
of government." Ibid.
III
As in the prior challenge to the Line Item Veto Act, we initially confront jurisdictional questions.
The appellees invoked the jurisdiction of the District Court under the section of the Act entitled "Expedited
Review." That section, 2 U.S.C. §692(a)(1), expressly authorizes "[a]ny Member of Congress or
any individual adversely affected" by the Act to bring an action for declaratory judgment or injunctive
relief on the ground that any provision of the Act is unconstitutional. Although the Government did not
question the applicability of that section in District Court, it now argues that, with the exception of
Mike Cranney, the appellees are not "individuals" within the meaning of §692(a)(1). Because
the argument poses a jurisdictional question (although not one of constitutional magnitude), it is not
waived by the failure to raise it in the District Court. The fact that the argument did not previously
occur to the able lawyers for the Government does, however, confirm our view that in the context of the
entire section Congress undoubtedly intended the word "individual" to be construed as synonymous
with the word "person."
The special section authorizing expedited review evidences an unmistakable congressional interest in a
prompt and authoritative judicial determination of the constitutionality of the Act. Subsection (a)(2)
requires that copies of any complaint filed under subsection (a)(1) "shall be promptly delivered"
to both Houses of Congress, and that each House shall have a right to intervene. Subsection (b) authorizes
a direct appeal to this Court from any order of the District Court, and requires that the appeal be filed
within 10 days. Subsection (c) imposes a duty on both the District Court and this Court "to advance
on the docket and to expedite to the greatest possible extent the disposition of any matter brought under
subsection (a)." There is no plausible reason why Congress would have intended to provide for such
special treatment of actions filed by natural persons and to have precluded entirely jurisdiction over
comparable cases brought by corporate persons. Acceptance of the Government’s newfound reading of §692
"would produce an absurd and unjust result which Congress could not have intended." Griffin
v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 574 (1982).
We are also unpersuaded by the Government’s argument that appellees’ challenge to the constitutionality
of the Act is nonjusticiable. We agree, of course, that Article III of the Constitution confines the jurisdiction
of the federal courts to actual "Cases" and "Controversies," and that "the doctrine
of standing serves to identify those disputes which are appropriately resolved through the judicial process."
Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 155 (1990). Our disposition of the first challenge to
the constitutionality of this Act demonstrates our recognition of the importance of respecting the constitutional
limits on our jurisdiction, even when Congress has manifested an interest in obtaining our views as promptly
as possible. But these cases differ from Raines, not only because the President’s exercise of his
cancellation authority has removed any concern about the ripeness of the dispute, but more importantly
because the parties have alleged a "personal stake" in having an actual injury redressed rather
than an "institutional injury" that is "abstract and widely dispersed." 521 U. S.,
at (slip op., at 18).
In both the New York and the Snake River cases, the Government argues that the appellees are not actually
injured because the claims are too speculative and, in any event, the claims are advanced by the wrong
parties. We find no merit in the suggestion that New York’s injury is merely speculative because HHS has
not yet acted on the State’s waiver requests. The State now has a multibillion dollar contingent liability
that had been eliminated by §4722(c) of the Balanced Budget Act of 1997. The District Court correctly
concluded that the State, and the appellees, "suffered an immediate, concrete injury the moment that
the President used the Line Item Veto to cancel section 4722(c) and deprived them of the benefits of that
law." 985 F. Supp., at 174. The self-evident significance of the contingent liability is confirmed
by the fact that New York lobbied Congress for this relief, that Congress decided that it warranted statutory
attention, and that the President selected for cancellation only this one provision in an act that occupies
536 pages of the Statutes-at-Large. His action was comparable to the judgment of an appellate court setting
aside a verdict for the defendant and remanding for a new trial of a multibillion dollar damages claim.
Even if the outcome of the second trial is speculative, the reversal, like the President’s cancellation,
causes a significant immediate injury by depriving the defendant of the benefit of a favorable final judgment.
The revival of a substantial contingent liability immediately and directly affects the borrowing power,
financial strength, and fiscal planning of the potential obligor.
We also reject the Government’s argument that New York’s claim is advanced by the wrong parties because
the claim belongs to the State of New York, and not appellees. Under New York statutes that are already
in place, it is clear that both the City of New York and the appellee health care providers will be assessed
by the State for substantial portions of any recoupment payments that the State may have to make to the
Federal Government. To the extent of such assessments, they have the same potential liability as the State
does.
The Snake River farmers’ cooperative also suffered an immediate injury when the President canceled the
limited tax benefit that Congress had enacted to facilitate the acquisition of processing plants. Three
critical facts identify the specificity and the importance of that injury. First, Congress enacted §968
for the specific purpose of providing a benefit to a defined category of potential purchasers of a defined
category of assets. The members of that statutorily defined class received the equivalent of a statutory
"bargaining chip" to use in carrying out the congressional plan to facilitate their purchase
of such assets. Second, the President selected §968 as one of only two tax benefits in the Taxpayer Relief
Act of 1997 that should be canceled. The cancellation rested on his determination that the use of those
bargaining chips would have a significant impact on the Federal budget deficit. Third, the Snake River
cooperative was organized for the very purpose of acquiring processing facilities, it had concrete plans
to utilize the benefits of §968, and it was engaged in ongoing negotiations with the owner of a processing
plant who had expressed an interest in structuring a tax-deferred sale when the President canceled §968.
Moreover, it is actively searching for other processing facilities for possible future purchase if the
President’s cancellation is reversed; and there are ample processing facilities in the State that Snake
River may be able to purchase. By depriving them of their statutory bargaining chip, the cancellation
inflicted a sufficient likelihood of economic injury to establish standing under our precedents. See,
e.g., Investment Company Institute v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617, 620 (1971); 3 K. Davis & R.
Pierce, Administrative Law Treatise 13—14 (3d ed. 1994) ("The Court routinely recognizes probable
economic injury resulting from [governmental actions] that alter competitive conditions as sufficient
to satisfy the [Article III ‘injury-in-fact’ requirement]. . . . It follows logically that any . . . petitioner
who is likely to suffer economic injury as a result of [governmental action] that changes market conditions
satisfies this part of the standing test").
Appellees’ injury in this regard is at least as concrete as the injury suffered by the respondents in
Bryant v. Yellen, 447 U.S. 352 (1980). In that case, we considered whether a rule that generally
limited water deliveries from reclamation projects to 160 acres applied to the much larger tracts of the
Impe- rial Irrigation District in southeastern California; application of that limitation would
have given large landowners an incentive to sell excess lands at prices below the prevailing market price
for irrigated land. The District Court had held that the 160-acre limitation did not apply, and farmers
who had hoped to purchase the excess land sought to appeal. We acknowledged that the farmers had not presented
"detailed information about [their] financial resources," and noted that "the prospect
of windfall profits could attract a large number of potential purchasers" besides the farmers. Id.,
at 367, n. 17. Nonetheless, "even though they could not with certainty establish that they would
be able to purchase excess lands" if the judgment were reversed, id., at 367, we found standing
because it was "likely that excess lands would become available at less than market prices,"
id., at 368. The Snake River appellees have alleged an injury that is as specific and immediate
as that in Yellen. See also Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc.,
438 U.S. 59, 72—78 (1978). |
