Part I: Background to Terrorism

Part I: Background to Terrorism, draws upon the expertise of Dr. Jonathan R. White, author of Terrorism: An Introduction, Third Edition (2002). White's text is part of The Wadsworth Contemporary Issues in Crime and Justice Series. The part begins with several official definitions of terrorism and then goes on to discuss terrorism as a world threat with particular attention paid to the origins of Middle Eastern Terrorism. The last section of Part I looks at the threat of technological and biological terrorism faced by the United States-

A. Defining Terrorism

Even governmental bodies have several definitions of terrorism.

State Department: Title 22 of the United States Code section 2656f(d) contains the following definitions: The term "terrorism" means premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience. The term "international terrorism" means terrorism involving citizens or the territory of more than one country. The term "terrorist group" means any group practicing, or that has significant subgroups that practice, international terrorism.

SOURCE: 1999 Patterns of Terrorism.

FBI: The FBI defines terrorism as "the unlawful use of force or violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a Government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives." The FBI further describes terrorism as either domestic or international, depending on the origin, base, and objectives of the terrorist organization.

SOURCE: http://www.fbi.gov/publish/terror/ terrusa.html.

Vice President's Task Force: Terrorism is the unlawful use or threat of vio- lence against persons or property to further political or social objectives. It is usually intended to intimidate or coerce a government, individuals or groups, or to modify their behavior or politics.

SOURCE: Vice President's Task Force, 1986.

United Nations: A TERRORIST is any person who, acting independently of the specific recognition of a country, or as a single person, or as part of a group not recognized as an official part or division of a nation, acts to destroy or to injure civilians or destroy or damage property belonging to civilians or to governments in order to effect some political goal.

TERRORISM is the act of destroying or injuring civilian lives or the act of destroying or damaging civilian or government property without the expressly chartered permission of a specific government, thus, by individuals or groups acting independently or governments on their own accord and belief, in the attempt to effect some political goal.

SOURCE: http://www.inlink.com/~civitas/mun/ res9596/terror.html.

Defense Department: Terrorism is the unlawful use or threatened use of force or violence against individuals or property to coerce or intimidate governments or societies, often to achieve political, religious, or ideological objectives.

SOURCE: http://www.periscope.usni.com/demo/ terms/t0000282.html.

Defense Intelligence Agency: Terrorism is premeditated, political violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine state agents, usually to influence an audience.

SOURCE: http://www.periscope.usni.com/demo/ terms/t0000282.html.

B. The Domestic Response to Terrorist Attacks on America:
An Operational and Legal Assessment

This essay is originally written for this Web site by Alejandro del Carmen, University of Texas, Arlington

The morning of Tuesday September 11, 2001 was not expected to be any different from other summer mornings. Most Americans went about their business--rushing to work, dropping their children off at school, and planning their day as cell phones rang and crowded elevators suggested that the monotonous morning routine was at hand. However, at approximately 8:45 a.m., the world stood still with images of a civilian airplane crashing into the north tower of the World Trade Center. The assumption by those failing to admit foul play, was that this incident constituted nothing more than an accident by a pilot that may have lost consciousness or perhaps it was due to a mechanical failure. This, however, was a short-lived position. At approximately 9:03 a.m., a second civilian airplane crashed into the south tower of the World Trade Center, leaving no doubt that this constituted a terrorist attack on America. This was later confirmed by reports that another airplane had crashed into the Pentagon while another hijacked plane had crashed south of Pittsburgh.

Those of us who watched live television on the morning of September 11, 2001 almost instantly recognized that we were living an historical moment that would be remembered and discussed for generations to come. Although many issues have been raised regarding the September 11th terrorist attacks, little has been discussed regarding the method of response and legality of operations being followed by government officials. Thus, the attempt here will be to examine both the law enforcement response and coordination efforts while discussing the legal framework of operation that supports the jurisdiction of federal law enforcement agencies and the executive branch in their efforts to fight terrorism.

The Law Enforcement Response

The law enforcement response to the September 11 terrorist attacks was immediate and followed what could be described as a "mechanical" and procedural model of operation. On September 11, at approximately 9:17 a.m., in accordance with procedures already established for purposes of responding to terrorist incidents, the Federal Aviation Administration¹ (FAA) acting under the direction of the Federal Bureau of Investigation ²(FBI), closed all New York City airports. Soon after, the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey ³ proceeded to shut down all New York area bridges and tunnels. This was followed by the FAA’s instructions to ground all flight operations in the United States until further notice. This marked the first time in U.S. history when all air traffic had been completely halted.

Looking back at the sequence of events of September 11, many experts have argued that the swiftness and coordination of federal agencies such as the FBI and FAA, in conjunction with the New York Police Department ⁴ (NYPD) , was essential in preventing further terrorist attacks on September 11th. In fact, intelligence reports and evidence gathered by sources close to the investigation have revealed that additional terrorist attacks involving the use of commercial airliners had been planned for later on that day. Thus, the coordination of federal, state, and local authorities which resulted in the grounding of all U.S. airline carriers, not only prevented other terrorist attacks from taking place but also made it possible for federal agencies to re-assess the situation and direct resources where needed.

The coordination of federal agencies with local authorities in times of crisis have long been the topics of conversation in congressional hearings, budget appropriations committees, and the White House. These have assisted in the appropriation of federal funding for the planning, implementation, and rehearsal of crisis management operations. There is very little doubt that rehearsals helped federal authorities in coordinating their response to the September 11 tragedy.

The role of federal agencies in responding to terrorist acts is clearly outlined in government crisis management plans. The FBI serves as the lead federal agency in resolving a "crisis" while enjoying the assistance of at least one of sixteen state-based terrorism task forces that are currently in place throughout the country. Regarding the September 11 terrorist attacks, the FBI and New York Police Department Joint Terrorism Task Force ⁵(FBI-NYPD JTTF) took over the immediate responsibility of controlling and re-assessing the crisis continuously. They were assisted, as outlined in crisis management plans, by the Federal Emergency Management Agency ⁶ (FEMA) in the coordination of "consequence management" (e.g., evacuation and search and rescue efforts) of the New York and Washington D.C. terrorist acts. However, it is important to note that due to the possibility that a situation could emerge (i.e., the September 11 terrorist attacks) dictating the need for an agency that could address "crisis" and "consequence management" needs simultaneously, the FBI has been authorized to perform both "crisis" and "consequence management" until the attorney general transfers the "consequence management" role to FEMA. Regarding the September 11 attacks, FEMA has played an instrumental role in coordinating and deploying 9-11 task forces to New York from various states including Massachusetts, Ohio, Missouri, Indiana, and California. Another four task forces were deployed to the Washington area. The principal task of these task forces was to participate in search and rescue missions; sadly, these turned into recovery missions once it was determined that only a few individuals survived the collapse of the World Trade Center towers.

In the event that a foreign country requests assistance to respond to a terrorist act committed against United States interests abroad, the U.S. State Department ⁷ assumes primary responsibility for the coordination and distribution of federal resources to honor this request. Moreover, in the event of a terrorist attack on America, the U. S. Department of Defense’s ⁸ (DOD) primary responsibility is to provide specialized technical resources and logistical support to other federal agencies. Further, the DOD is said to remain flexible in its role to provide other forms of assistance as prescribed by the President of the United States. In cases involving nuclear threats, the U.S. Department of Energy provides technical and scientific assistance to locate hidden nuclear material while diagnosing possible nuclear devices. Although the September 11 attacks did not involve a nuclear threat, the U.S. Department of Energy has undertaken an active role in the support of the operations carried out by other federal agencies. Some of these include the Public Health Service ⁹ (PHS) and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention ¹⁰ (CDC). The primary responsibility of the PHS and CDC is to provide scientific personnel and equipment to assist in the investigation, control, and treatment of possible biological and chemical materials associated with terrorist attacks.

Following the recent terrorist attacks in New York and Washington D.C., the PHS and CDC continue to exhibit an active role in testing and treating individuals whose test results have suggested the presence of Anthrax—a virulent bacteria, usually a hazard of farm workers, which has been used as a chemical weapon. In addition to these and other federal agencies, the resources and technical assistance provided by state and local authorities is regarded as critical in the overall response to terrorist attacks. In an attempt to improve current and future efforts of local, state, and federal agencies in planning and responding to terrorist acts, the President of the United States has recently announced the creation of The Office of Homeland Security ¹¹. Although no one seems to know the main role this office will likely exert in its apparent oversight of other federal agencies, it is critical to examine both the legality and jurisdiction of federal agencies including The Office of Homeland Security, as they investigate and assess the current crisis affecting the United States.

Perhaps the role of the Office of Homeland Security and other federal agencies will be further defined as the United States moves to a greater phase of vulnerability. No one seems to ignore any longer the potential that exists for further terrorist attacks on American soil; perhaps the most traumatic psychological impact of these recent attacks is the question of when and how these attacks will come next. Some argue that they will be in the areas of cyberspace. That is, computers at major corporations, including government-based equipment, are likely to be the subjects of cyber-terrorist attacks initiated from overseas. It is further speculated that the banking industries along with the military are of particular vulnerability to acts of cyber-terrorism. According to Dartmouth’s Institute for Security Technology Studies, significant increases in computer attacks on governmental and corporate web sites and computer systems occurred around September 11; the true threat to computer security and financial, infrastructure, telecommunications, and corporate systems will only be known as time passes.

The effect of the current public panic regarding our current vulnerability to terrorism has recently taken the form of hatred towards middle-eastern groups that somehow resemble, in our minds, the culprit of the September 11 tragedy. Sadly, the situation is likely to escalate as the population begins to profile fellow members of the community by demanding that they "take another flight" or "select another bus." The overall attitude is one of hatred and suspicion that may result in a collective public outcry that demands the oppression and perhaps even the isolation of Americans of middle-eastern descent.

Jurisdiction of Federal Agencies

The federal agencies currently involved in the investigation of the September 11 terrorist acts are acting under the legal authority established by a series of executive and legislative acts that have been introduced in the past 18 years. Since President Reagan authorized the FBI to serve as the leading agency in responding to acts of terrorism against the United States, the U.S. Congress and the executive branch have helped enhance the jurisdiction of federal agencies in their counter-terrorism efforts. According to the former FBI Director Louis J. Freeh, in a statement before the Senate Judiciary Committee (1988), the FBI counter terrorism capabilities were greatly enhanced in 1984 and 1986 when "Congress passed laws permitting the Bureau to exercise federal jurisdiction overseas when a U.S. National is murdered, assaulted, or taken hostage by terrorists, or when certain U.S. interests are attacked." It is important to note that ever since Congress passed these laws, the FBI has conducted several hundred investigations overseas with the most recent involving the USS Cole. In addition, the power of the FBI and other federal law enforcement agencies was greatly enhanced by Congressional initiatives such as the Antiterrorism and Intelligence Authorization Acts and the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996. Regarding the latter, section 302 of this Act authorizes the Secretaries of State and Treasury along with the Attorney General to designate as Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs) certain groups that meet specific criteria pertaining to their affiliation or financial support of terrorism. This designation, as has been evident in recent weeks, facilitates the United States Government with substantial power to freeze, through U.S. financial institutions, the assets belonging to FTOs.

With the recent approval of antiterrorism legislation, there is strong likelihood that the capability and jurisdiction of federal law enforcement agencies will expand significantly. For instance, among the new powers granted to them, federal agencies will be capable of detaining non-U.S. citizens suspected of terrorism for up to seven days without charging them with a specific offense. Federal law enforcement agencies will also enjoy relaxed wire tapping laws and greater subpoena powers for e-mail records of terrorist suspects.

The current assignments of most law enforcement agencies to different investigative tasks are being coordinated and delegated by Attorney General Ashcroft. As Attorney General of the United States, he has been given the authority to delegate and assign different roles to each of the federal agencies working on the September 11 terrorist case. Further, he oversees the prosecutorial aspect of these cases as well. That is, he has the authority to assign criminal cases to any of the hundreds of federal prosecutors that currently work for the Department of Justice.

Regarding the jurisdiction of the Homeland Security Office (HSO), it is expected that Tom Ridge, the recently appointed director of the HSO, will develop partnerships with federal, state, and local jurisdictions in an effort to detect, prepare, and respond to terrorist threats or attacks within the United States. As former governor of Pennsylvania, Governor Ridge brings to his new post a reputation of being tough, fair, and decisive. Further, as a former U.S. Marine, it is expected that Governor Ridge will carry out his duties successfully. These include the detection, prevention, preparation, protection, and response to terrorist threats against the United States.

Clearly then, the HSO will hold federal jurisdiction in its attempt to address current and future terrorism threats. In addition, recent congressional reports have suggested that HSO Director Ridge will benefit from more power than anticipated as bipartisan legislation expanding the authority of the HSO has been recently introduced and is currently being considered. In addition to the HSO, other offices of the executive branch of government in general, and the President of the United States specifically, have also enjoyed in the recent past, legislation that expands their authority in circumstances that threaten national security. For instance, the Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS) has, under the provisions of the legislative-based Federal Public Health Statutory Authority, the power to assist States when facing communicable diseases or other health epidemics. Further, the so-called Posse Comitatus Act presents a long-standing national policy of defining the law enforcement role of civilian authorities; however, it leaves room to assign the military to this function in cases and under specific circumstances as authorized by the U.S. Constitution or Act of Congress.

Aside from Article II of the U.S. Constitution, the President of the United States has special powers granted by the legislative branch, through the enactment of special Congressional Acts, when facing unusual circumstances threatening the stability of the United States. Some of these Acts include the Insurrection Act (empowers the president to use the military), the Stafford Act (allows the use of federal resources to support state and local governments at times of domestic disaster), the National Emergencies Act (reflects on Congress’ judgment regarding the presence of presidential procedural requirements in some circumstances), and the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (provides direction to the president regarding the protection of public health and the environment). Clearly then, as we move to fight what has been called by some as "America’s new war," we must ask how much extraordinary power the framers of the Constitution would have allowed for the federal government to obtain in light of the current terrorist attacks on American soil.

References

Anti-Defamation League. (1999). "The Joint Terrorism Task Force: A Concept that Works." Law Enforcement Agency Resource Network. Washington, DC.

Bodrero, D. Douglas (1999). "Confronting Terrorism on the State and Local Level."
FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin. March 1999, Volume 68, Number 3.

National Domestic Preparedness Office. (2001). NDPO Fact Sheet. Thomas G. Kinnally. Washington, DC.

Stevens, Paul Schott. (2001). "U.S. Armed Forces and Homeland Defense: The Legal Framework." Center for Strategic and International Studies. Washington, DC.

The White House Press Release. (2001). "President Establishes Office of Homeland Security." Washington, DC. October 13, 2001.

U.S. Department of Justice. (1999). Mrs. Barbara Y. Martinez, Deputy Director-National Domestic Preparedness Office. "Preparedness for Terrorism Response: Before the U.S. House of Representatives." Congressional Statement: Federal Bureau of Investigation. Washington, D.C. June 9, 1999.

U.S. Department of Justice. (1998). Louis J. Freeh, Director-FBI. "U.S. Government’s Response to International Terrorism." Before the U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee. Congressional Statement: Federal Bureau of Investigation. September 3, 1998.

¹  The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) oversees civil aviation in the United States. Further, it regulates the maintenance, operation, and certification of aircrafts flying in the continental United States. Its role since September 11 has been to oversee the safety-related flaws that have been cited as partly responsible for the recent terrorist incidents.

²   The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) is the principal investigative agency of the United States Department of Justice. Its origins date back to 1908 when Attorney General Charles Bonaparte created a force of several special agents. Since September 11, the FBI, as the lead law enforcement agency, has committed its principal resources including approximately 4,000 field agents and 300 support staff members to the on-going terrorist investigation.

³  The New York/New Jersey Port Authority oversees the transportation infrastructure of a common area to both states—New York and New Jersey. Its main role during the September 11 attacks has been of cooperation with the FBI regarding the opening and closing of tunnels, bridges, and airports in the New York/New Jersey areas.

⁴   The New York Police Department (NYPD) is one of the oldest police departments in the United States. It dates back to 1658 when Dutch settlers established the Burgher guard—a paid group of eight patrolmen who were on the lookout, during evenings, for raids or fires. Today, the NYPD has a force of 38,000 officers who currently assist the FBI in its efforts to apprehend individuals associated with the September 11 terrorist attacks.

⁵   FBI and New York Police Department Joint Terrorism Task Force (FBI-NYPD JTTF) work together to prevent panic and share technological and intelligence-related information in order to more effectively investigate and apprehend individuals suspected of terrorism. Today, the FBI-NYPD Joint Terrorism Task Force is working closely with other federal agencies in an attempt to follow every possible lead that will uncover more information regarding the September 11 attacks on New York City.

⁶   The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) is an independent governmental agency that responds directly to the President of the United States. FEMA is currently made up of 2,500 individuals who work on a full time capacity. They are assisted by over 5,000 stand-by disaster reservists who may be called as needed. The mission of FEMA has been to provide leadership and support in order to reduce the loss of life and property. Further, it aims at protecting the United States from all types of hazardous materials. Today, FEMA works closely with the FBI in the search and rescue and recovery missions at what has been called "ground zero"---the general area that used to house the World Trade Center Towers.

⁷   The United States Department of State is the lead United States governmental agency in charge of foreign affairs. The Department aims at the advance of U.S. objectives and interests overseas. Further, it protects the lives of American citizens overseas. Since September 11, the State Department has been active in promoting a strong coalition that supports the retaliation of the U.S. military. Internally, they have provided other federal agencies including the FBI with information regarding the foreign support received by terrorists in order to carry out their criminal act against the United States on September 11, 2001.

⁸   Department of Defense (DOD) is in charge of military affairs. It is headed by the Defense Secretary—a cabinet-level post created by Congress in 1947. Today, the Department of Defense oversees all branches of the United States military and advices the President of the United States on military affairs. Since September 11, the DOD has planned and executed a military campaign against Osama Bin Laden and the Taliban regime. In addition, DOD criminal investigators have coordinated their efforts with the FBI in the investigation on the attacks against the Pentagon on September 11.

⁹   Public Health Service (PHS) is the United States principal agency, which oversees over 300 programs aimed at protecting the health of all Americans. Today, the PHS has collaborated with the Centers for Disease Control and other federal agencies in the investigation of envelopes with Anthrax recently mailed to media and government officials.

¹⁰   Centers for Disease Control (CDC) is the lead federal agency charged with protecting the health and safety of people in and outside the United States. It also aims at preventing and controlling diseases while employing scientific research techniques designed to identify diseases throughout the world. Since the September 11 attacks, the CDC has deployed teams to Florida, New York, and Nevada in an attempt to respond to the Anthrax scare that is currently affecting the United States.

¹¹   The Office of Homeland Security was recently created by President Bush, with the aim of developing and coordinating a national strategy to offer security to the United States from terrorist attacks. The office is already beginning to coordinate the efforts by the executive branch to detect, protect and respond to any threats of terrorism in the United States. Although the September 11 attacks on the United States prompted the President to create this new office, it is expected that the role of the Office of Homeland Security will continue to increase and make a significant impact in the coordinating efforts of the federal government as it attempts to address the terrorism threat in the United States.

C. Origins of Middle Eastern Terrorism

The origins of modern terrorism have been reviewed in terms of its spread from Western European ideology to Russia, then back to the West by the incorporation of Russian revolutionary thought in the nationalist struggle in Ireland. Before discussing modern terrorism, it is necessary to look at the historical development of conflict in the Middle East. Several Middle Eastern groups took the concepts of modern terrorism and transformed them into a mode of conflict. This chapter introduces the development of religious and historical conflicts in the Middle East and the historical role of terrorism in the area. After you read this chapter, you should be able to do the following:

1. Outline a religious, political, and historical introduction to the Middle East.
2. Provide a brief synopsis of the major problems in the Middle East.
3. Identify the three primary sources of terrorism in the Middle East.
4. Describe the Zionist movement in Palestine from the beginning of World War I to the Arab Revolt.
5. Describe the role of terrorism in the birth of modern Israel.
6. State the problems caused by intra-Arab power rivalries.
7. Explain the origins of Shiaism and its impact on revolutionary Iran.

AN INTRODUCTION TO THE REGION

The term Middle East refers to a section of the world that encompasses North Africa, Southwest Asia directly south of Turkey including the Arabian peninsula, Iran, and Afghanistan. (See map in Figure 7.1.) Some commentators also include Pakistan in their geographical definition of Middle East because it is dominated by Islamic culture. The term was coined by American naval strategist Alfred Thayer Mahan toward the end of the nineteenth century. Albert Hourani (1997) presents one of the most definitive histories of the area. According to Hourani, the area is dominated by two major concerns: the religion of Islam and the history of the Arab people.

The Prophet Mohammed, the founder of Islam, received a series of revelations from Gabriel, an angel known in Hebrew and Christian traditions, about 610 C.E. Mystified by his encounters with the angel and unable to write, Mohammed returned to his family after each event and related the angel's accounts of God's desires for humanity in a series of poems and verses. Dutiful family members recorded these revelations, and they were incorporated into a holy book called the Q'ran, or the Verses. Mohammed, elated by his angelic encounters with the Almighty, spread a message of universalism, love, and monotheism.

Although Mohammed's message was essentially based on love, discipline, and submission to God's will, merchants in his hometown of Mecca were incensed by his religious pronouncements. Mohammed spoke of a final judgment against evil. Such eschatology threatened the religious trade of Mecca, a trade center where various cultures crossed paths and many deities flourished in an atmosphere of polytheism. In short, there was a profit to be made in statues, charms, and relics, and Mohammed's talk of one universal power uniting humankind was bad for business. The merchants took the only logical step they could see. They tried to kill Mohammed.

Fleeing from Mecca, the Prophet's utterances did not stop. He gained a large following and in a few years returned to Mecca not only with a message of love, but also with a sword. Mohammed declared a holy war, a jihad, on all nonbelievers. Mecca became a holy city, and the Arab realm of Islam spread. At the time of his death about 632, Islam was a dominating and growing force in the Middle East.

Mohammed's followers spread Islam and Arabic culture through the Middle East in the years after his death. Two dynasties of leaders, the Umayyads (661Ð750) and the Abbasids (750Ð1258), ruled the area in the years following Mohammed. Hourani points out that these leaders, or caliphs, theologically divided the world into the Realm of Islam and the Realm of War. The purpose of Islam was to subject the world to God's will. Indeed, Islam means submission to the will of God, and a Muslim is one who submits.

About 1000 C.E. the Turks began to take the domains of the Abbasids. Struggles continued for the next 100 years until a Mongol advance from east Asia brought the Abbasid dynasty to an end. The Mongols were eventually stopped by an Egyptian army of slaves, and their descendants gave rise to a new group of Turks known as Ottomans. The Ottomans were aggressive, conquering most of the Middle East and large parts of Europe. The Ottomans fought the Iranians on one border and central Europeans on the other border for many years.

Map of the Middle East

European relations with Islamic empires were not characterized by harmony. The West began its first violent encounters with the European attempts to conquer the Middle East known as the Crusades (1095 to about 1250). These affairs were bloody and instigated centuries of hatred and distrust between Muslims and Christians. European struggles with the Ottoman Empire reinforced years of military tensions between the two civilizations. Modern tensions in the area can be traced to the decline of Ottoman influence and the collapse of Iranian power in the eighteenth century. When these Islamic powers receded, Western Christian powers were quick to fill the void.

Yonah Alexander (1976) points out that issues of power shifts were complicated by a late nineteenth century concept called Zionism. Zionists began moving to Palestine in the 1890s for the purpose of establishing a Jewish homeland. This created some tension, as Syria and Egypt were vying for control of the area. The problem exploded in 1914, when World War I internationalized the political problems of the Middle East. Modern Middle Eastern terrorism can be traced to World War I's (1914Ð1918) political watershed.

A SYNOPSIS OF SOME MAJOR PROBLEMS

To understand terrorism in the Middle East, it is necessary to appreciate certain recent aspects of the region's history. To best understand the Middle East, keep the following assumptions in mind:
1. The current structure of Middle Eastern geography and political rule is a direct result of nineteenth century European imperial influence in the region and the outcomes of World War I.
2. Many of the Arab countries in the Middle East place more emphasis on the power of the family than on contemporary notions of government. However, Israel rules itself as a parliamentary democracy.
3. The modern state of Israel is not the nation mentioned in the Hebrew and Christian Bibles or the Islamic Q'ran. It is a secular power dominated by people of European descent.
4. Arabs, and Palestinians in particular, do not hold a monopoly on terrorism.
5. The religious differences in the region have developed over centuries, and fanaticism in any one of them can spawn violence. There are fanatical Jews, Christians, and Muslims in the Middle East who practice terrorism in the name of religion.
6. Although the Middle East has been volatile since 1948, the year Israel was recognized as a nation-state, modern terrorism grew after 1967. It increased after 1973 and became a standard method of military operations in the following two decades.
7. In 1993, however, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) renounced terrorism. Ironically, this has created tremendous tension. On the Arab side, some groups have denounced the PLO's actions while others have embraced it. The same reaction has occurred in Israel, where one set of political parties endorses peace plans and another prepares for war. Middle Eastern peace is a very fragile process, and terrorism is a wild card. It can upset delicate negotiations at any time, even after a peace treaty has been signed and implemented (for an example, see Hoffman, 1995).
8. All of these issues are complicated by a shortage of water and vast differences in social structure. The area contains some of the world's richest and some of the world's poorest people. Most of them are far from water sources.

One can best begin to understand the Middle East by focusing on the world of the late 1800s. During that time period, three critical events took place that helped to shape the modern Middle East.

First, the Ottoman Empire, the Turk-based government that ruled much of the Middle East, was falling apart in the nineteenth century. This meant the Ottoman Turks encountered domestic challenges across their empire as various nationalistic, tribal, and familial groups revolted, and they faced foreign threats, too. The Iranian empire had collapsed earlier, but Great Britain, France, Germany, and Russia intervened in the area with military force. Each European country was willing to promise potential rebels many things, if they revolted against the Turks. Realistically, few of those promises could be kept.

The second critical event came from a political movement called Zionism. From 1896 to 1906, European Jews, separated from their ancient homeland for nearly 2,000 years, wanted to create their own nation. Some of them favored Palestine, whereas others wanted to move to Argentina. In 1906, those who backed Palestine won the argument, and European Jews increasingly moved to the area. They did not ask the Palestinian Arabs, the people who lived in Palestine, for permission.

Finally, European armies engulfed the Middle East from 1914 to 1918, as they fought World War I. They continued to make contradictory promises as they sought to gain spheres of influence in the region. When the war ended, the victorious nations felt they had won the area from the Turks. They divided the Middle East, not with respect to future political problems but to share the spoils of victory. This created long-term political problems.

D. Technological and Biological Terrorism

U.S. VULNERABILITY TO TECHNOLOGICAL TERRORISM

The United States is the most technologically advanced superpower in the world. Technology has opened new doors to the future, which many Americans have taken for granted. Other national competitors have taken advantage of the United States's nonchalant attitude toward technology at times, but the United States stands as one of the masters of new industrial and technological techniques. Along with Japan and Western Europe, the United States is a technologically oriented society.

The irony of U.S. success with technology is that the country has become vulnerable to attacks on technology and by technology. One does not have to agree with Brian Clark's political position to understand that the United States is dependent on technology. While the military has taken precautions to shield defense and weapons systems from interference, civilian industry has fallen behind. Given U.S. dependence on technology, this has created a window of opportunity for terrorists.

There is no clear way to react to the problem of technological vulnerability. Some analysts, like Halstead and Ballard (1997), have called for rigid new safeguards and massive new security efforts. Others believe a calm assessment of potential threats is more in order (Heim, 1984). Analysts do not agree about the extent of the threat, and most of them focus on weapons of mass destruction. A study by B. J. Berkowitz et al. (1972) was one of the first to examine the implications of mass destruction weapons in the hands of terrorists. Its conclusion was that civil chaos would result. According to the study, several attempts were made by radical groups to employ some level of CBW attack from 1967 to 1970. Although this information is dated, the Aum Shinrikyo attack in Tokyo demonstrates the reality of the threat.

The Berkowitz study points to several areas of vulnerability. Metropolitan water supplies are subject to contamination. Although poisons would dissipate in a large volume of water, general public reaction would be one of panic. In addition, criminal organizations have attempted to produce chemical weapons for extortion and assassination. Berkowitz and his colleagues also point out attempts to steal or produce CBWs in Europe and the United States.

Robert Mullen (1978) also examines modern society's vulnerability to technological weapons. The capacity for mass destruction is a recent historical development. In the past, killing many people required many people to do the killing. Technology has changed this. Mass destruction terrorism can be inferred from CBWs and nuclear weapons.

Mullen states that terrorism based on massively destructive weapons involves skills that few terrorist groups possess.Technical weapons require technical skills and support networks.Many groups lack these capacities, but Mullen says the past may not be indicative of the future.The capability for mass destruction exists.

Robert Kupperman and Darrell Trent (1979) deal with some of the issues posed by technological threats. Kupperman (1985b) examines the issue again, with a specific focus on organizational responses to technological threats, and he describes the potential threat that technological terrorism poses for the United States. Both Kupperman and Trent strike a middle ground, however, between complacently ignoring the problem and overreacting to it.

In Kupperman and Trent's analysis, responsible policies should be developed to meet the potential threat. The response should be one of policy analysis and application. Industrial and technological safeguards will work only if they are accompanied by proper emergency procedures. Kupperman and Trent suggest models for restructuring U.S. federal bureaus and emergency planning networks.

Unlike many analysts, Kupperman and Trent believe the analytical literature on terrorism to be fairly complete. They do not see the need to add to the theoretical body of knowledge. Instead, they argue that Walter Laqueur has appropriately described the historical and social background of terrorism and that Brian Jenkins has adequately analyzed current and future trends. The only gap in the literature is in the area of technology.

The authors were trying to get policy moving in the direction of counterterrorism; technology provided their motivation for writing. Kupperman and Trent believe the problem of technological terrorism has generally been ignored and the U.S. government is woefully underprepared to deal with a technological threat. Accordingly, they describe several horrifying potential scenarios for terrorism (without giving terrorists clues on weapons construction or utilization). They hope the devastating nature of the scenarios will grab policymakers' attention.

Kupperman and Trent believe that social deterrents are insufficient to rule out the use of mass destruction weapons. Increased possession of nuclear and chemical weapons has been accompanied by their use or threatened use. Nation-states have legitimized the use of mass destruction weapons, hence paving the way for terrorists to adopt them. The analysts conclude that it is time to start realizing the truly destructive nature of such weapons.

The most common type of terrorist weapon is a bomb. It has been historically popular, it is easy to deliver, and it poses a difficult puzzle for police to solve. Kupperman and Trent say that when groups mature, they move toward more sophisticated weaponry, but in their initial stages, groups find that bombs are cheap and effective tools. Kupperman and Trent state that the danger is an enhancement of bombs through CBWs or nuclear capacities. Recent experience demonstrates that even sophisticated conventional bombs can destroy civilian aircraft.

Kupperman and Trent argue either type of weapon can be used for psychological impact, and they predict the public would react with panic if either nuclear or CBW agents were introduced by terrorists. They believe that because nuclear bombs are difficult to make or steal, terrorists would achieve the same psychological impact by spreading radioactive materials. If accompanied by an effective means to spread the toxins, chemical and biological weapons have a similar potential.

Attacks on technological targets are another way to achieve mass destruction without the need for technological weapons. In addition, Kupperman and Trent point to the ability of terrorists to paralyze the economy by attacking targets necessary for production and service. Electrical power grids are important from this standpoint, and the most likely targets are transmission lines and transformers. Gas and petroleum lines are even more vulnerable, and conventional and nuclear power plants present tempting targets. They also consider the vulnerability of computer networks.

In Kupperman and Trent's analysis, counterterrorism must begin with a reorganization of the federal bureaucracy. Without discussing the specifics for each agency, their recommendations can be summarized in two steps. First, the analysts want a few key federal agencies to have definite responsibility for emergency situations. The role of individual agencies should be spelled out in policy guidelines, and bureaucratic managers should be held responsible for their agencies' abilities to deal with potential terrorism.

In their second series of recommendations, Kupperman and Trent want the government to develop realistic management plans to coordinate the response of its various units. There is a need to develop a small, knowledgeable crisis staff to direct operations in the event of a technological attack. According to the researchers, it is not necessary to become preoccupied with the counterterrorist functions of each agency because mass destruction terrorism is a lowprobability occurrence. However, preparing for an event with key managers can serve as both a deterrent and a practical method to restore normalcy in the event of an attack.

Some security specialists have focused on the idea of prevention. Indeed, it comprises the philosophy of such organizations as the American Society for Industrial Security. Prevention of technological terrorism is a corollary to safeguarding technological materials. Robert Kindilien (1985) makes this argument with reference to the nuclear power industry. Enhanced security will reduce the risk of losing dangerous material and waste. American industry is currently vulnerable to such losses. Kindilien says it is necessary to assess risks and attack them with an aggressive security system.

Another point about the vulnerability of the United States has been raised by many analysts. If a mass destruction threat developed, the initial public reaction would probably be one of panic. A fear of chemical weapons and radioactivity pervades popular culture. If the American public believed a major city was in jeopardy, there is reason to believe fear would sweep the nation. In a climate of fear, cherished liberties can be destroyed.

Russell Ayers (1975) and John Barton (1980) have raised this issue. In this sense, the corollary to technological terrorism is another threat. In reacting to potential mass destruction, security and police powers would be increased. In many societies, this has been closely correlated with a decline in civil liberties. The ideal function of the American justice system is to protect individual rights, but historically, in times of panic, the government and the police have forgotten this. There is good reason to believe that technological terrorism would create panic, and civil rights often fall by the wayside in such situations.

Another potential target of technology and terrorism is the energy industry. Oil and gas are the United States's chief means of energy. An article placed in an addendum to the Kupperman and Trent analysis raises the problem of securing the energy industry. The analysis claims the transportation and storage of fossil fuels is not as safe as people tend to assume.

SECURITY PROBLEMS IN THE ENERGY INDUSTRY

The United States relies on energy to support its technology, and the interruption of energy supplies could be construed as a national security threat. If a nation or terrorist group could shut off U.S. energy, it could close down major portions of the economy. Secure energy production, transportation, and storage are all critical to the United States.

Kupperman and Trent state that electrical systems are quite vulnerable. Attacks on key power transformers could stop the flow of electricity to large segments of the country for quite some time. Damage to key generating facilities would also have long-term effects. Currently, the threat is localized. Power stations and transformers have been subject to industrial sabotage, but this has had only local, short-term effects.

Maynard Stephens (1979, pp. 220Ð223) assesses the vulnerability of U.S. oil and natural gas systems. Stephens argues the interruption of oil and gas delivery would have the most devastating economic impact of any attack on energy. The reason is that oil and gas form the United States's greatest source of energy. Seventy-five percent of U.S. energy needs are filled by oil and gas. Although electrical power grids have backup supplies, no method of continuing service is available if oil and gas lines are destroyed.

According to Stephens, the efficiency of the systems is the major problem. Industry and government planners designed U.S. pipelines for maximum flow and distribution of the product. As a result, oil and gas are channeled over hundreds of miles in a highly efficient and concentrated set of pipelines. But this very efficiency has weakened the security of the system: An attack on a major line would magnify the scope of the attack.

Stephens's main worry is the lack of federal and state concern about protecting the gas and petroleum industries. He claims the government has taken almost no protective measures. Stephens says because domestic terrorism in the United States has not often been manifested, threats to the oil and gas industries appear to be abstract.

Things have changed since Stephens's article appeared. Not only has the United States been subject to domestic terrorism, but also some of it has been supported by foreign governments. Kupperman and Trent appear to have been correct. In the early stages-the World Trade Center and Oklahoma City, for example-the primary weapon has been the bomb. More sophisticated attacks can be expected in the future. The oil and gas distribution systems are perfect targets. Transportation centers and parts are next in line.

To illustrate the point, consider a situation like the 1991 Persian Gulf War. American heavy equipment for the war was shipped through ports along the Atlantic seaboard and the Gulf of Mexico. Assume you are a Middle Eastern leader and the United States is preparing a Desert StormÐstyle operation against your country. You do not have conventional military forces cable of stopping the United States, but you have several terrorist training camps in your country and links to international terrorist structures inside the United States. What could you do?

If you had the technological sophistication, it would be relatively easy to strike the United States. If you could cause sufficient explosions in the ports at Houston, Charleston, Norfolk, and New York, you would limit American capacity to move heavy equipment to the Middle East. If this was combined with attacks on the electrical power grid and gas pipelines, your efforts would be more effective. Finally, a few well-placed bombs like that in Oklahoma City would cause general panic.

This hypothetical scenario is not designed to make you paranoid, and if it did happen, it probably would not end with a devastating defeat of the United States. In addition, any nation that would attempt such an undertaking would require extensive planning and coordination, something far beyond the leadership capacity of a street thug like Saddam Hussein. If it did happen, however, it would isolate military forces in the region and hamper their supply lines. In the opening stages of Desert Storm, it could have resulted in thousands of American casualties. Therefore, policies and emergency plans must begin to anticipate U.S. technological vulnerability. If terrorism is approached as a legal problem, a national defense role for federal, state, and local police agencies must be recognized.

THE THREAT OF NUCLEAR TERRORISM

The most frequently discussed aspect of future terrorism is nuclear attack, and it seems to have a psychological impact far more frightening than other scenarios. This may be due to the widespread fear of nuclear weapons, or to the fact that a greater body of knowledge on the topic is available to the general public. Regardless, it is frequently impossible to discuss the future of terrorism without examining the potential impact of nuclear weapons or radioactive material (Sanz, 1992).

One of many analysts who have addressed the question of nuclear terrorism, B. David (1985) makes four critical points about the issue. First, nuclear terrorism and chemical and biologicalweapon terrorism are usually discussed together. Second, true nuclear terrorism requires either a difficult production process or the theft of radioactive materials or weapons; CBW agents are easier to produce and obtain.Third, a key to responding to nuclear terrorism is to discern the motivation of a group that might be willing to use weapons of mass destruction. Finally, there are still social sanctions against employing such weapons.

Martha Crenshaw (1977) raises other points. First, Crenshaw is concerned about the proliferation of nuclear materials on an international level. She believes the abundance of nuclear materials increases the likelihood of nuclear terrorism.

More than two decades after Crenshaw's analysis, the nuclear issue still dominates segments of the international agenda. President Clinton signed a United NationsÐsponsored antinuclear treaty in 1996, but some nations, such as India, refused to support the ban. The collapse of the Soviet Union also made active nuclear weapons available to terrorist groups.

Crenshaw also expresses concern about the spread of the nuclear power industry. The number of nuclear power plants increases the potential for attacks on power-generating stations and the theft of waste material. Terrorists who lack the ability to build or buy nuclear weapons can simply obtain nuclear waste from a generating station and detonate it. This would produce a groundlevel "nuclear" blast, complete with fallout.

Brian Jenkins (1975, 1980, 1986, 1987) has approached the question of nuclear terrorism cautiously and provides several answers. He gave his first answer in 1975, admitting that his conjectures were purely speculative. His answer has been slightly revised through the years, but his initial response has been partially validated by nearly three decades of developments in terrorism. Basically, Jenkins says we do not know whether terrorists will use nuclear weapons but we have no reason to assume that they will automatically evolve in that direction.

Jenkins says nuclear terrorism is possible, but he is reluctant to see it as a major threat. He believes terrorists are rational creatures, and nuclear terrorism is irrational. Nuclear weapons would not work in low-level operations, and once the weapons were deactivated, there would be no incentive for governments to continue to honor any negotiated promises. Social restraints tend to make nuclear devices impractical.

However, the possibility of nuclear terrorism cannot be dismissed. Jenkins points out that many Americans believe nuclear terrorism is more likely than a nuclear war. Trends in nuclear-related terrorism have reinforced public beliefs. Jenkins equates attacks on nuclear facilities with nuclear terrorism, and his data indicate that attacks on the nuclear industry and on weapons facilities are declining. Yet attacks continue, accompanied by the general trend toward an increased level of violence. If nuclear terrorism is not inevitable, it is certainly not impossible.

Nuclear terrorism could take a variety of forms. Jenkins says terrorists could attack nuclear facilities and use the entire area as a weapon. They could also simply steal material or ask a ransom for it. Terrorists could fabricate a nuclear hoax, and the ensuing panic might be as dangerous as a threatened explosion. In the simplest case, terrorists could spread radioactive material; in the most complex case, they might detonate a device. More recently, British sources (Ryan, 1996) indicate that the Russian Mafia has attempted to sell live nuclear weapons and supporting technology on the black market. The term nuclear terrorism is used frequently, but for a variety of potential activities.

Several people have commented on Jenkins's position. Paul Leventhal and Yonah Alexander (1986, pp. 33Ð53) recorded a speech by Jenkins on nuclear terrorism and some experts' reactions to it. One member of the audience, David Mabry of the U.S. Department of State, agreed with Jenkins about the rationalism of terrorists. Mabry said terrorists do not kill for the sake of killing; they have a political motivation for their actions.

Mabry disagrees with Jenkins's assessment of the probability of nuclear terrorism. Given the increasing violence of terrorist groups, the lure of nuclear terrorism is becoming too great. State sponsors of terrorist groups have greater access to nuclear weapons, further increasing the possibility of such terrorism. Mabry was convinced that Iran and Libya would not hesitate to use nuclear weapons in a terrorist incident. Finally, because bombing is the most popular terrorist act, nuclear bombing might simply be viewed as its logical extension.

Yural Ne'eman, a physics professor and former Israeli cabinet minister, also disagreed with Jenkins. He was critical of Jenkins's reluctance to distinguish attacks on nuclear facilities from the use of nuclear materials in terrorism. Ne'eman said they are not the same thing and they certainly are not positively correlated. Therefore, declining rates of attacks on nuclear facilities had no connection with the probability of a use of nuclear material in terrorism.

Ne'eman also believed most terrorism was state-sponsored. Far from the individual groups that Jenkins imagined, Ne'eman saw most terrorists as an extension of national governments. Ne'eman agreed with Mabry that Iran and Libya were prime candidates for the use of nuclear weapons. He also added Iraq to the list and completely dismissed Jenkins's notion that terrorists would be somehow constrained by a sense of morality.

Larry Collins and Dominique Lapierre (1980) wrote a terrorist thriller titled The Fifth Horseman that featured fictional state-sponsored technological terrorism. The premise of the book is that Moamar Khadaffy has managed to construct a hydrogen bomb. He places the weapon in New York City by clandestinely shipping it to the United States with a semiautonomous terrorist group. An army of bureaucrats, emergency personnel, and police officers search for the device while Khadaffy negotiates with the U.S. president about Libyan demands. The United States is paralyzed in its response for a variety of diplomatic reasons.

The premise of the novel is exciting, and the book is fun to read. In the real world, however, the scenario poses some problems. If a nation was to sponsor nuclear terrorism against the United States, it would run the risk of full American military reprisal. Mass destruction could obviously be construed as an act of war; American military forces have been deployed for terrorist events of far less significance than a nuclear explosion. This refers back to the policy debate between legality and defense.

The United States has undertaken efforts to prepare for technological terrorism. According to Christopher Dobson and Ronald Payne (1982b, pp. 51Ð76), an array of federal agencies has joined forces to combat all acts of domestic terrorism. Donald A. DeVito and Lacy Suiter (1987, pp. 416Ð432), both directors of state emergency planning agencies, suggest that the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) be used as the clearinghouse for bureaucratic coordination. They say terrorism demands emergency planning. FEMA has taken a leading role in preparing for effective interaction among local, federal, and state governments. It is supported by a variety of federal regulatory bodies and law enforcement agencies.

BIOLOGICAL AND CHEMICAL TERRORISM

Chemical and biological agents might well be the weapons of choice should terrorists use weapons of mass destruction. FEMA (1998) gives several reasons. First, biological and chemical agents are easier to produce than nuclear weapons or radioactive material. Second, as many as 26 nations appear to have developed chemical weapons, and 12 more nations are seeking to do so. In addition, 10 other nations have biological weapons programs. Finally, chemical and biological agents are easier to transport and utilize than nuclear weapons. Chemical and biological weapons are relatively easy to use, they are available, and they are mobile. Have they become, as some people argue, the poor person's nuclear bomb?

To answer this question, look at the nature of each agent. Ron Purver (1995) offers an outstanding summary of open source information on chemical and biological agents. Purver says biological weapons are based on microorganisms and poisons produced by plants and animals. Most of the weapons terrorists would use have been classified as agents that would produce fever, a plague, or some other type of infectious disease. Some of the agents are extremely lethal, while others would be used to incapacitate people. Purver also says some terrorism analysts fear the development of a genetically engineered disease.

Chemical agents are not as lethal as biological agents, and they are easier to control. The four common types of chemical weapons are: nerve agents, blood agents, choking agents, and blistering agents (see Table 15.1). Nerve agents enter the body through contaminated food or water, air, or contact with skin. They cause uncontrolled body fluids to flow from openings in the body and induce muscle spasms. In high doses, victims can go into convulsions, and death may come from the evacuation of body fluids within a matter of minutes. Sarin is a common type of nerve weapon. Blood agents are absorbed through breathing and are carried through the body by breathing. They cause lethal damage by reacting with enzymes in the body. Hydrogen cyanide, the gas used in Nazi concentration camps, is a blood agent. Choking chemicals, such as chlorine gas, attack the lungs and prevent people from breathing. These agents cause the walls of the lungs to flood with mucus, and the victim literally drowns in the secretions. Blistering agents are liquids or gases that burn the skin. The mustard gas used in World War I is a blistering agent (Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, 2000).

There are many advantages for terrorists who would like to use chemical or biological weapons. John Deutch (1996), former Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, believes the availability of chemical and biological weapons and the ease with which they can be transported make them the weapon of choice for terrorists who want to useWMDs. Jessica Stern (1998) says terrorists may use chemical and biological agents with crude delivery systems. In addition, Stern points out that the resulting panic caused by the use of such horrendous weapons will increase the aura of the group employing them.

While these weapons are horrific, many analysts feel they are inadequate substitutes for nuclear weapons. The reason is that there are more disadvantages than advantages. Leonard Cole (1996), one of the leading experts in the field of chemical and biological weapons, points out that these weapons are difficult to control.

Biological weapons virtually have no controls, and once they are introduced, the group using the weapon might well become a victim. For example, if a terrorist group was able to start a black plague epidemic in a major city, how could it stop the spread of the disease? In addition, it takes time for a biological agent to work. It must incubate, then spread from person to person. Most biological agents are destroyed by weather and sunlight. The agents that can survive, such as concentrated anthrax, are so lethal that they would threaten to contaminate their users for decades. According to Cole, biological weapons are unreliable.

Table 15.1 Chemical and Biological Agents

SOURCES: Canadian Intelligence Service, and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons.

Chemical weapons are more readily controlled, but they are not as lethal. The FBI's Larry Mefford (1996) shows that chemical weapons are best used in a confined area. They would be an excellent choice for an attack on a building, but their effectiveness in mass destruction is limited. Despite these disadvantages, one should not assume that these weapons will not be used. Terrorists have access to chemical and biological weapons, they have used them, and will probably use them again.

Stephen Bowers and Kimberly Keys (1998) offer a sobering analysis of the likelihood of continued chemical and biological terrorism. Like many other analysts, Bowers and Keys believe the recent infusion of racism and religion in terrorist activities has changed the structure of modern terrorism. Religious zealots are more interested in destruction than the aura created by media coverage. Chemical and biological agents are attractive to such people.

Bowers and Keys propose a three-step methodology for approaching terrorism and technology. First, they argue that group profiling and behavioral analysis has been a powerful tool for counterterrorism. To paraphrase a popular witticism among psychology professors, nothing predicts future behavior like past behavior. Bowers and Keys recommend that law enforcement and defense agencies aggressively analyze the behavior of terrorist groups in order to predict future behavior. Second, like Doug Bodrero, they recommend constant monitoring of social indicators. Terrorist groups do not develop overnight; they are produced by social forces. Law enforcement personnel must constantly monitor the social climate that produces violence. Finally, Bowers and Keys state a key point. Security personnel must share information. The days of FBI, CIA, and ATF rivalries are long gone. WMD threats make agency rivalries superfluous.

Law enforcement and the military can learn quite a bit about responding to WMDs from the firefighting service. Firefighters have dealt with chemical spills and biological disasters for decades. They have systems to identify and contain contaminated areas. Indeed, they already employ the biological and chemical detection systems used by the armed forces. Law enforcement, security, and military personnel can find a wealth of information on response at the National Fire Academy in Emmitsburg, Maryland.

CYBERTERRORISM

On January 22, 2000, President Clinton announced a billion dollar plan to fight cyberterrorism. The first question that came to many analysts of terrorism minds was: Is there a cyberterrorism? The answer is not clear. Former FBI counterterrorism specialist William Dyson (2000) perhaps gives the best answer. Dyson says computer terrorism is not a form of terrorism, but terrorists may use computers during the commission of terrorist acts.

Terrorists may use computers in a number of ways. Yael Shahar (1997) envisions scenarios where viruses are implanted in an enemy's computer. He also predicts "logic bombs" that lie dormant for years until they are instructed to overwhelm a computer system. Shahar also believes bogus chips can be sold to sabotage an enemy's computer network. Trojan horses can have a malevolent code to destroy a system, while back doors allow terrorists to enter "secure" systems. Shahar also believes conventional attacks such as overloading an electrical system serve to threaten computer security.

Michael Whine (1999) agrees with Shahar's conclusions, claiming that computer technology is attractive to terrorists for several reasons. Computers allow groups to remain connected, while allowing covert discussions and anonymity. Computer networks are also much less expensive and work intensive than the secretive infrastructures necessary to maintain terrorist groups. Computers also allow terrorists to reach their audiences with little effort. Whine concludes that computers are a force multiplier for terrorist groups.

Bowers and Keys (1998) believe cyberterrorism appears to be a threat because of the nature of modern society. Cyberterrorists may attack the infrastructure. In other words, they can destroy the underpinnings of the social base.Bowers and Keys believe this happens in terms of information flow. Since modern Western society functions on information, cyberterrorists threaten to interrupt or confuse the flow of information. Imagine, they say, an attack on the banking industry through the flow of fund information. Such an attack could completely devastate a society.

Bowers and Keys believe the ability of cyberterrorists to disrupt the economic system is matched by their ability to destroy confidence in social institutions. Cyberterrorists could make an audience feel as if their world is falling apart. Cyberterrorists can target health institutions as well as government services and businesses. They may even attack defense establishments.

By the same token, Bowers and Keys say cyberterrorism belongs to a broader category called "information warfare."Dyson (2000) agrees with all of these conclusions, and adds that terrorists even use the computer to train other terrorists. There is no doubt that computers are vulnerable to crime, and terrorists do use and will continue to use computers. In addition, Tiffany Danitz and Warren Strobel (1999) indicate that political activists can use the Internet as a command-and-control mechanism. Computer security is a necessity in commerce, government, and personal affairs. Terrorists, enemy military forces, criminals, hackers, and others will use computers to their advantage at the expense of others.

This chapter has presented the most depressing aspect of modern terrorism, the megadeath and destruction that can be wrought by terrorists using technology. Yet, Dyson's point needs to be considered. Computers are tools used by terrorists. WMDs and other forms of technology represent the same thing. Perhaps there is no technological terrorism, but there are terrorists who will use technological weapons. Regardless of the terminology, it is a frightening scenario.

Part II: Religion and Terrorism

Religion is a system of beliefs, symbols, and rituals, based on some sacred or supernatural realm, that guides human behavior, gives meaning to life, and unites believers into a community. Social Scientists study the role religion plays in society, how people become religious and the different forms of religious organizations. Religion has long played a crucial role in the development of social and political attitudes. In this part the site draws, again, from White, Terrorism, and from Joan Ferrante's text, Sociology: The United States in a Global Community, Fourth Edition (2000). Prof. Ferrante writes on religion with an emphasis on Afghanistan.

A. Religion and Middle Eastern Terrorism

Middle Eastern terrorism is centered on the struggle for control of the area claimed by the Israelis and the Palestinians. Closely related to this issue is the spread of fundamentalist Islam beyond the Iranian Revolution. This struggle has appeared in three forms: struggle for control of the Palestinian movement, the directions of revolutionary Islam, and the spread of terrorism from the Afghan war. Since the mid-1990s, all three of these issues have been dominated by fervent religious fundamentalism. The Palestinian movement has been influenced by revolutionary Islam, especially from Hamas and Islamic Jihad. Other revolutionary groups are spreading in Egypt, Sudan, Pakistan, and Algeria. One of the main international threats comes from a group headed by Osama bin Ladin. Jewish fundamentalism has spawned its own anti-Arab terrorism. All of these violent extremist views threaten a very fragile peace process. After reading this chapter, you should be able to:

1. Describe two different views of Islam and terrorism.
2. Describe the metamorphosis of Hizbollah and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad.
3. Summarize the philosophy and structure of Hamas.
4. Outline the history and structure of Osama bin Ladin's organization.
5. Explain bin Ladin's connections to fundamentalism and the links with terrorist violence in Egypt, Pakistan, and Algeria.
6. List and describe other religious terrorist groups in the Middle East.
7. Describe the problem of Jewish fundamentalism and violence.

TWO VIEWS OF ISLAM AND TERRORISM

The American view of Islam has been influenced by various presentations of Islamic extremism in the electronic media, and it has been influenced by popular misconceptions and stereotypes. Daniel Pipes (1983) wrote an outstanding theological and political analysis of Islam nearly 20 years ago. In an insightful summary of theological positions, Pipes demonstrates that many Western attitudes are incorrect. Islam is a legalistic religion more closely related to traditional Judaism than Pauline Christianity, even though all three religions worship the same God.

Unfortunately, Pipes's work did not receive the recognition and influence it deserved. If more policymakers had acted on Pipes's analysis, Americans may have found that many of their religious precepts match those found in Islam. Although most Muslims express religious concepts by combining theological and moral positions in political institutions, Islam is no more a religion of violent fanatics than Judaism or Christianity. Yet, many Americans have little knowledge of Islam. Today most Americans subscribe to one of two positions about Islam and terrorism.

Reuven Paz (1998) summarizes one particular position, but it can also be found in such journalistic examinations as Robin Wright (1986, 1989), Dilip Hiro (1987), and Amir Taheri (1987). This view states that Islamic fundamentalism is related to political violence in the Middle East. Paz pursues this further by asking the question: Is there an Islamic terrorism? His answer is yes.

Paz argues that Islam sees itself in a global war with the West. This is exacerbated by socioeconomic differences. Islamicists divide the world into the realm of Islam (dar al-Islam) and the realm of heresy (dar al-Harb). Islamic radicals have relegated the West to the realm of heresy. Paz says success against heresy is measured in the popular support of terrorist groups. Since Muslims in general see themselves in a struggle with the West for social and political reasons, Paz concludes that popular support of militant Islam indicates an "Islamic terrorism" exists. He says the West should not debate its existence, it should defend itself against Islamic terrorism.

Others are not so quick to accept such logic. David Kibble (1996) argues that Islamic fundamentalism seems to be a threat at face value. Radical groups of Islamics in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Iran, and other areas appear to have declared war on the United States and its allies. Indeed, an American secretary of defense stated that Islamic fundamentalism is the greatest threat to American security since Communism. Kibble believes such fears are unfounded.

Kibble says there are pockets of Islamic extremism in the Middle East that sustain terrorism. He argues, however, that these segments are isolated and divided. There is a broad spectrum of religious and political beliefs in Islam that rejects violence. Kibble believes that when fundamentalists take power, it may be the first step toward democracy. He urges caution in labeling Middle Eastern violence as "Islamic terrorism."

Clarence Bouchat (1996) agrees. He says American fears and misunderstandings of Islam make it appear as if fundamentalists were united and threatening to gather the Middle East in a war against the West. This is not the case. Fundamentalists are a divided lot, just as religious fundamentalists in the United States are divided. The history of the West and the Middle East involves centuries of religious wars. Bouchat says more is to be gained by examining the religious similarities between the two regions than by using such terms as "Islamic terrorism."

It is quite clear that violent religious fanatics are playing key roles in Middle Eastern terrorism. This has resulted in a new type of terrorism in the region. In the 1990s, several international structures emerged in the name of religion. No longer relying on rogue states or the interests of competing nations, these groups have emerged as a cause unto themselves. Religion is the basis of their calling, and they attract followers throughout the region.

THE IRANIAN REVOLUTION AND HIZBOLLAH'S METAMORPHOSIS

When Israel invaded Lebanon in 1982, the Iranians responded by sending their Revolutionary Guards, creating and supporting a new terrorist network. At first glance, the connection seems to be an illogical geographical link, but closer examination reveals the purpose. The Israeli invasion prompted responses throughout the Muslim world, and the Iranians, hard-pressed to deal with their young revolutionaries at home, found a perfect place to export their unruly zeal. Locked in a large war with Iraq, the Iranians found Lebanon a place to fan the fires of revolution.

The name Hizbollah literally means "the Party of God."According to Dilip Hiro (1987, pp. 113Ð181, 240Ð243), Hizbollah grew out of the Iranian Revolution as an extension of the Revolutionary Guards. The Revolutionary Guards were the military wing of the Ayatollah Khomeini's organization. Hizbollah assisted the Revolutionary Guards by attempting to purify the revolution. It attacked all forms of Western thought and sought to consolidate Khomeini's gains.

Hiro says the members of Hizbollah were not only interested in carrying out the goals of the revolution, but also concerned with the social conditions of Islam in general. This helped account for their loose organizational structure. The Party of God was more a meeting of similar minds than a group interested in a rigid, formal structure. Shiaism was the heart of Hizbollah, and Shiites throughout the Middle East were the concern of the group. The Shiites of Lebanon were no exception. Wege (1994) adequately demonstrates Hiro's argument. The term Party of God is taken from Islamic references and is directly related to the martyrdom of Hussein Ibn Ali. Failure to understand Hizbollah as an Islamic concept is a failure to understand the context of evangelical Islam.

According to Hiro, relations between Lebanese and Iranian Shiites had been close since the 1950s. When conflict broke out in Lebanon in 1975, Amal, a Shiite militia, was formed to protect Lebanese Shiites. Amal was trained by the PLO, but it developed and maintained strong Iranian contacts. In 1979, it grew in strength, and its members watched the Iranian Revolution with interest.

According to Anat Kurz (1994), Palestinian and Lebanese radicals found common ground in the 1980s. Nabih Berri was elected general secretary of Amal in 1980. This event caused concern among the more radical members of Amal, including those who supported the Iranian Revolution, because they believed Berri was a constitutionalist and too conservative. In 1982, the radicals left Amal for the Syrian-controlled Bekaa Valley, where they formed a new group, Islamic Amal, and awaited further developments. When the first Revolutionary Guards of Hizbollah arrived in the Bekaa Valley in 1982, they found willing allies in the Islamic Amal.

For the first few years of its involvement, Hizbollah acted more or less like a terrorist clearinghouse (Reuters, 1996a). Following orders from Iran, Hizbollah met as an independent organization, always willing to deny its Iranian connections. According to Israeli intelligence (Israeli Foreign Ministry, 1996), Hizbollah was directed by three central figures: Sheik Mohammed Hussein Fadlollah, Abus Musawi, and Hassan Nasrallah. Fadlollah, the target of an attempted American-sponsored assassination, was a charismatic spiritual leader. Nasrallah was a practical militarist, leaving the Islamic Amal militia to organize Hizbollah into a regional force. Musawi provided the loose connections to Iran.

From 1982 to 1985, Hizbollah formed a relationship with a shadowy terrorist group known as Islamic Jihad. According to Amir Tehari (1987), Hizbollah leaders met to give policy direction for Islamic Jihad. The council of leaders met in the city of Baalbek in Lebanon's Bekaa Valley and issued nebulous "suggestions" to Islamic Jihad. They also provided financial and logistical support for terrorist operations but kept themselves out of the day-to-day affairs of the terrorist group. By keeping their distance, Hizbollah's leaders were able to claim they had no direct knowledge of Islamic Jihad, and more importantly, they kept Iran from being directly linked to Islamic Jihad's terrorist campaign against Israel and the West.

During this same time frame, Hizbollah's role also began to change. As part of an organization designed to spread the Shiite revolution, Hizbollah was not content to act only as an umbrella group to support terrorism (Enteshami, 1995; Reuters, 1996a). Its leaders wanted to develop a revolutionary movement similar to the structure that gripped Iran in 1978 and 1979. Lebanon was inundated with several militias fighting for control of the government, and Nasrallah saw an opportunity. By following the pattern of the Amal militia, he began changing the structure of Hizbollah. In 1985, he established regional centers, transforming them to operational bases between 1987 and 1989. Taking over the organization after the death of Musawi, Nasrallah created a regional militia by 1990. In 1991, many of Lebanon's roving paramilitary groups signed a peace treaty, but Hizbollah retained its weapons and revolutionary philosophy. It became the primary paramilitary force in southern Lebanon (U.S. Department of State, 1996).

According to an analysis by Reuters (1996b), Hizbollah is currently fighting an undeclared war with Israel (see Box 10.1 for a sampling of its paramilitary activities). Vowing to disrupt the peace process and continue the revolution, members strike Israel in a style reminiscent of the early days of Fatah. The terrorist group it once commanded, the Islamic Jihad, has expanded and taken on a life of its own. Although Hizbollah conducts its own terrorist operations, it behaves more like a militia seeking control of Lebanon. Because most of the Lebanese militias were disarmed in 1991, Hizbollah's triumph in keeping its structure and weapons have placed it in a position of power. LikeAbu Nidal, its structure allows it to act as a power broker in a world of shadow warfare.

By the same token, the paramilitary structure of Hizbollah has made it more of a conventional fighting force than a terrorist group since 1991. This results in a particular type of fighting. Unlike Islamic Jihad or the Abu Nidal group, Hizbollah's bases are in the open. When it strikes Israel, the Israeli Defense Force strikes back. Civilians caught in the crossfire are often at the mercy of opposing factions. In one tragic exchange, Israeli artillery shells hit a Palestinian village in April 1996, even though the shells were aimed at Hizbollah rocket launchers. Unfortunately, this type of exchange is nothing new to the area.

THE ISLAMIC JIHAD

Although Hizbollah found an ally in the Islamic Jihad when it came to the Bekaa Valley in 1982, the Iranian Revolution was not directly responsible for the birth of this terrorist group. Islamic Jihad began as a political movement inside the Muslim Brotherhood. Actually, there are several Islamic Jihads, and they are mostly nationalistic factions of the same movement. The group that receives greatest attention emerged after the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon, and it came from the link with Hizbollah. This Islamic Jihad perfected three tactical innovations of terrorism: a dynamic "umbrella" organizational structure, the use of suicide bombers, and the shift away from hijackings and hostage-takings to individual kidnappings.

According to official Israeli reports (Israeli Foreign Ministry, 1996), Lebanon's Islamic Jihad was born in Israel and is currently commanded from Syria. Its leader, Dr. Fathi Shekaki, created the group in 1981. After the Israeli invasion of Lebanon, his fanatics flocked to Hizbollah and Hassan Fadlollah, the spiritual leader of Hizbollah. Shekaki and Fadlollah were immediately attracted to one another by similar visions, and Fadlollah brought Shekaki's organization under Hizbollah's umbrella.

The Israeli Foreign Ministry states that Shekaki participated in the "conference management" style of Hizbollah but took the organizational structure a step further. If Musawi and Nasrallah (the two leaders of Hizbollah) were looking for distance between terrorist activities and Iran, Shekaki saw the Hizbollah model as a new method for structuring terrorism. Rather than operating as a single entity, he broke Islamic Jihad into a multitude of smaller groups, creating distance between any terrorist act and the terrorist group. Each operation could literally have its own small terrorist group, and Islamic Jihad could hide in a flow of misinformation. In actuality, Shekaki's Islamic Jihad became an umbrella group, itself under the umbrella of Hizbollah.

Robin Wright (1986, pp. 84Ð86) writes that the structure of Islamic Jihad was different than anything the West had ever faced before. Most groups could be identified by an infrastructure and a support network. This was not the case with Islamic Jihad. It was a dynamic network distributing information from the secrecy of Baalbek. It contained a fluctuating number of secret organizations and cells. Although U.S. officials talked of state-sponsored terrorism, this group had no clear links to Iran. Islamic Jihad was a hidden army. As a result, its structure confused Western intelligence sources for nearly a decade.

To strike, Shekaki chose a new weapon: the suicide bomber. Amir Taheri (1987) states that after the first suicide bombing in 1983, Islamic Jihad launched a devastating suicide bombing campaign in Lebanon. In 1984, its activities spread to Kuwait and Tunisia, and it became clear that the struggle was not just for Lebanon but for the Islamic revolution. By 1986, in Taheri's estimation, fighting had moved to Europe. This brand of international terrorism is endorsed because it involves a holy war against all parties resisting the Islamic revolution. Taheri refers to it as the "holy terror."

The use of suicide bombers frightened and baffled the West, but it was logically explicable in terms of the conflict, according to Maxwell Taylor and Helen Ryan (1988). Taylor and Ryan examine the role of fanaticism in Shiite terrorism and conclude that the use of suicide bombers was particularly successful in Lebanon. A suicide bomber became an inexpensive guided missile ensuring the success of an attack.

SOURCE: Israeli Foreign Ministry, April 1996.

After a series of bombings in 1983 and the retreat of the U.S. Marines from Beirut, the weakness of Western defensive systems was completely exposed. Military forces from France, Israel, and the United States had employed a fairly sophisticated security system appropriate to peacekeeping situations in Western diplomacy. In several instances, suicide bombers penetrated these defensive perimeters and struck targets with relative ease.

Taylor and Ryan suggest this demonstrates a fundamental weakness of technologically based defense: None of the defenders had predicted the role of suicide in the Lebanese conflict. Taylor and Ryan argue it is necessary to define terrorism in Middle Eastern terms rather than to extrapolate fromWestern norms. From theWestern perspective, suicide attacks seem rooted in illogical fanaticism.Yet, this interpretation does not fit the Shiites fighting in Lebanon. Bombing was a logical policy-in fact, one of the few policies that worked against established military power. Because delivery of the bombs had to be guaranteed if the policy was to work, it was also logical to employ sacrificial warriors as delivery sources.

Shekaki also used another tactic, kidnapping. The development of specialized hostage rescue teams in the United States, Great Britain, and Germany forced Islamic Jihad to search for new hostage-taking tactics. Airplanes were hijacked, but hostages had to be dispersed. New Western rescue units, such as the British Special Air Service, the German GSG-9, and the American Delta Force, made traditional methods of taking hostages too risky. Kidnapping developed as an attractive alternative to massive hostage taking. Counterterrorist forces might be able to free hostages in a single incident, but dispersed kidnapping victims were another issue.

Islamic Jihad toyed with the idea of kidnapping in 1983, and by the next year, they launched a wholesale kidnapping campaign. At one point, they held more than 40 Western hostages. Hizbollah and Islamic Jihad saw they could not only gain the attention of the West with kidnappings, but also influence the behavior of Western governments.

The kidnapping policy of Islamic Jihad had several practical functions. It could be used to punish a country for acting against the Shiites. Hostages could be released for propaganda value, or, when an enemy took action against Islamic Jihad or its supporters, hostages could be executed. Finally, threats of harm to hostages or additional kidnappings could be used to influence another government's actions.

Tactical innovation came as a surprise to theWest. In a special article prepared for the New York Times, Philip Taubman (1984) writes that the United States had few solid leads on the Islamic Jihad, despite enhanced intelligence efforts. In a related article, Eric Pace (1984) describes the innovative use of car bombs in the Middle East. TheWest seemed at a tactical loss when dealing with Islamic Jihad. The Israelis took a different approach. Instead of mapping the hierarchy and flow of money, Israel identified the group's leaders and went after them.

The Israeli Foreign Ministry (1996) says Shekaki was captured and deported in 1988, but he resurfaced in Damascus in 1989. In the aftermath of the Persian Gulf War, Islamic Jihad moved its activities to Israel. Directing operations from Syria, Shekaki continued the struggle against Israel. When Arafat accepted the Israeli olive branch and elections in the occupied territories, Shekaki abandoned support for the Intifada (a general uprising) and returned to terrorism.

Shekaki addressed the issue in an interview with Time magazine (1995). He spoke of no peace until Israel was destroyed. He also reiterated his willingness to employ human-guided missiles, the suicide bombers. Unlike Hamas, he stated that Islamic Jihad was willing to accept a liberated Palestine devoid of a united Arab realm. The U.S. Department of State (1996) took such statements at face value, pointing to threats for an expanded suicide bombing campaign in 1995. Shekaki was killed in Malta in 1995.

Shekaki's successor, Dr. Ramadan Abdallah Sallah, has maintained the Shekaki philosophy. The Israeli Foreign Ministry (1996) says that as of 1992, Islamic Jihad is no longer able to hide as easily as it could in its early stages. Israeli and Western intelligence agencies have developed internal profiles of the group, and some of its leaders are known. More importantly, the growth and emergence of Hizbollah removed the umbrella covering of Islamic Jihad. The Shekaki faction was forced to operate like most other terrorist groups.

Following elections in the occupied territories, Islamic Jihad, like Hamas and Hizbollah, began a no-holds-barred campaign to disrupt the peace process. Israeli soldiers were kidnapped and executed, and bombings increased. The Israelis responded with controversial measures. Specialized squadrons of selected soldiers would raid suspected terrorist hideouts. Under this policy, suspects were interned while all their resources, including their homes, and the resources of their supporters were destroyed. Several suspected terrorists had been killed during these operations, and hundreds of homes were bulldozed into the ground.

The U.S. Department of State (1996) sums up Islamic Jihad's threat well. The State Department says it is a loose affiliation of several fanatical groups. It still probably receives aid from Iran, but the convoluted nature of the group makes it difficult to expose. Islamic Jihad does not have a hierarchy or infrastructure similar to other groups. Because it is so loosely bound, any one of the many groups may act autonomously.

HAMAS

One of the most volatile militant organizations in the Middle East is the Islamic Resistance Movement, better known as Hamas. Unlike Hizbollah and Islamic Jihad, it grew from the Palestinian movement. Mirroring the philosophy of the Rejectionists, Hamas's position is that the state of Israel should not exist. The only acceptable solution to the Palestinian problem is to eliminate Israel and create a united Arab realm. According to Hamas, the state of Israel and anyone who supports it are abominations to Islam.

To understand Hamas, it is necessary to go back to the events right after World War I. Because of the British promises, many Arabs felt that the entire Middle East, from North Africa to the Iranian border, would be united under one great Arabic banner, dar al-Islam. When European powers divided the area, taking control of some regions and placing their Arab allies in control of others, many Arabs were infuriated. One group of frustrated Muslims took action. Founded in Egypt about 1925, the Muslim Brotherhood rejected the new territorial lines. They called for unification of the entire Arab realm under the law and control of Islam.

In 1967, the Muslim Brotherhood began to grow in the occupied territories. Unlike the Ba'athists who expressed unity through modern socialism, followers of the Muslim Brotherhood wanted to purify Islam and unite with other Arabs under religious law. In some ways, the philosophy of the Muslim Brotherhood was a combination of the religious intensity of the Iranian Revolution and the unification principles of the Ba'athists, but the Muslim Brotherhood primarily represented ethnicity more than politics or religion. Their call for unity was as old as the Q'ran.

The group registered as a religious organization with the Israeli government in 1978, and its stated purpose was to be evangelical. Members attempted to convert followers into a more pristine version of Islam. They worked through universities, schools, and mosques. In the 1980s, however, as Arafat gravitated toward moderation, the Muslim Brotherhood maintained its rigid views on the unification of the realm of Arabs and the necessity to rule through Islamic law. When the demand for Palestinian self-government began to dominate the Palestinian movement, the Muslim Brotherhood rejected the call.

Self-government was abhorrent to the Muslim Brotherhood because no nation should exist outside dar al-Islam. If the fedayeen of Fatah were to betray their people by talk of compromise, the Muslim Brotherhood would take a different path.As a result of their disagreement with the goals of the Intifada, members of the Muslim Brotherhood formed Hamas, an Arabic acronym for the Islamic Resistance Movement, in 1987.The group has been active ever since.

Following the tactics of the old Irgun, Hamas has attempted to outdo former Palestinian terrorists. In its own literature, Hamas says that it is in a war with the Jewish people, as well as the state of Israel. The purpose of every operation is to kill Jews, and by killing Jews, all the Zionist settlers and their allies will be driven from the area. It is not enough to kill only the Jews, however. "Good" Muslims will kill anyone who accepts peace with the Jews or who speaks of an independent Palestine. The only acceptable outcome for Hamas is the united realm of Islam.

Hamas is well-financed and organized. As any large terrorist organization, it is composed of strike units, as well as logistical support columns. Its tentacles reach far outside the Middle East, including support bases in the United States. Ironically, its size has caused a moderate group to emerge from the ranks of the fanatics. Arafat has tried desperately to work with the moderates to stop the spread of terrorism. The goal of Hamas terrorists is to disrupt the peace process. They may succeed. Since 1989, they have been responsible for several hundred terrorist attacks.

Being a large organization, tens of thousands strong according to a 1996 State Department estimate, Hamas has a centralized structure with many branches. According to Ahmad Rashad (1996), an apologist for the group, Hamas's strength comes from Palestinian dissatisfaction with the PLO. Rashad states Arafat's softened attitude toward Israel prompted the rise of Hamas in 1987. As enthusiasm grew, Hamas's goal was to become the sole representative of the Palestinian people. Accordingly, it divided its operations into four main spheres: administration, charity, politics, and military affairs.

Rashad states that the most successful military actions have been taken by the Izz el-Din al-Qassam Brigades. Emerging from the military wing of Hamas, the al-Qassam Brigades swelled with recruits after Arafat's renunciation of terrorism in 1993. The brigades are divided into two factions: an intelligence wing and a commando wing.

Ironically, according to Rashad, the intelligence wing does not gather military intelligence. If Rashad is to be believed, the intelligence wing serves as an internal police force. It has three primary duties. First, it enforces Islamic law among the Palestinians, including the execution of offenders. Second, it serves as the main instrument for distributing propaganda throughout the occupied territories. Finally and very interestingly, it is the logistical support network for military operations. Reading through Rashad's propaganda, it is safe to assume the intelligence wing is designed for internal discipline and to supply and hide active terrorists.

The commando wing is designed for terrorist attacks, and it has three primary sections: training, operations, and intelligence. Rashad did not mention bombing or ambushes, two al-Qassam Brigade specialties, but he pointed with pride to "the abduction of enemy soldiers." This admission is quite appropriate. Taking a page from lessons in Lebanon, Hamas has kidnapped and executed individual Israeli soldiers. Although he refuses to identify the total number of commando units, Rashad identifies two groups that operated in the occupied territories and states the remaining groups functioned atlarge. In essence, the military wing is organized in the manner of any large terrorist group.

Hamas represents the continuing struggle for control of the Palestinian voice. Whereas the PLO has rejected terrorism, Hamas has embraced it, and it has become a rallying point for those wishing to continue the struggle with Israel. If anything, Hamas represents the issue so aptly identified by Ahmad Khalidi (1995). There can been no end to terrorism, Khalidi says, until the rights of Palestinians are guaranteed. Hamas will certainly maintain its appeal to disenfranchised Palestinians until that time.

THE RISE OF OSAMA BIN LADIN

To understand the rise of Osama bin Ladin, it is necessary to keep two things in mind. First, there is a trend among Islamic fundamentalists to attempt to bridge the theological gap between Sunnis and Shiites. This trend began to develop in Iran about 1988. According to Dov Waxman (1998), Iran has moved from a postrevolutionary, nationalist phase to the real politics of pan- Islam. That is, Iranian leaders slowly moved away from their blind allegiance to Shiaism and began supporting militant Sunnis. Revolutionary Iranians began sending money and support to Sunni terrorist groups in Lebanon, believing Iranian Shiites and Lebanese Sunnis were working for the same cause. Militant Sunnis followed suit, calling for peace between Sunnis and Shiites. Osama bin Ladin, a Saudi Arabian, was one such Sunni.

The second important factor in the rise of bin Ladin was the Soviet- Afghan War (1979Ð1989). In 1979, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan. Seven major guerrilla groups formed to resist the Soviets, and the United States enthusiastically joined the fray with arms and economic support. The resistance fighters called themselves the Holy Warriors, the mujahadeen. Embraced by the U.S. government, they traveled the United States calling the Soviets "foreign devils" and "infidels." Few of Ronald Reagan's political leaders noticed that the mujahadeen leaders used the same terms to describe Americans.

In 1989, the Soviets retreated from Afghanistan in complete disarray. Not only had they lost the war, but the Soviet Union also soon found itself in a state of collapse. Yael Shahar (1998) says the mujahadeen saw the fall of the Soviet Union as a sign of total victory. The Soviet Union had not collapsed under the weight of political, economic, and military factors, but in the minds of the mujahadeen, it fell by the hand of God. The Soviet retreat was a sign of God's power over Satan, and if God could bring down the Soviet Union through the work of the mujahadeen, other evil nations were doomed to destruction. The primary targets of the mujahadeen were Israel and the United States. One of the mujahadeen leaders who fervently believes in this view is Osama bin Ladin.

Yosseff Bodansky (1999) writes the most detailed biography of bin Ladin, although the work is polemical and does not seek objectivity. Bodansky says bin Ladin was one of 51 children born to a rich Saudi Arabian construction magnate in 1957. Bin Ladin received a university education and joined the family business, but he soon left Saudi Arabia to join the Afghan fight against the Soviet Union. At first, he lent support to the mujahadeen, later forming his own unit of guerrilla fighters.

While in Afghanistan, he fell under the influence of Sheik Abdullah Azzam, a doctor of Sharia (Islamic law). Azzam had been working for the Palestinians in the mid-1970s, but he became disillusioned with their nationalism and emphasis of politics over religion. Azzam believed Islam should rule over all forms of conflict. He left the Palestinians for a Saudi university to teach Islamic law.

Azzam was the answer to bin Ladin's prayers. As the rich Saudi construction engineer sought a path to holy war, he found the theology of Azzam to his liking. According to Azzam, the realm of Islam had been dominated by foreign powers for too long. It was time for all Muslims to rise up and strike Satan. The Soviet-Afghan War was just the beginning. The mujahadeen were in a holy war against all things foreign to Islam.

Bodansky points out the United States would hardly have been excited about funding such a group of rebels, but the Pakistani Intelligence Service (ISI) intervened. The ISI was concerned with the growing threat of the Soviet Union, but it had its own agenda for national security. Pakistan offered to act as the surrogate for the United States, training the mujahadeen and providing their base camps. According to Bodansky, all money, weapons, and other logistics would be funneled through the ISI. The American Central Intelligence Agency took the bait, and the ISI prepared for war against America's enemy. It also prepared for a larger war without telling the CIA.

Osama bin Ladin was in the midst of these activities. Training in Pakistan and Afghanistan, he financed mujahadeen operations and taught the guerrillas how to build field fortifications. By 1986, he left the training field for the battlefield. Enraged with the Soviets for their wholesale slaughter of Afghan villagers and use of poison gas, bin Ladin joined the front ranks of the mujahadeen. Allied with hundreds of radical militants throughout the world, Osama bin Ladin became a battlefield hero. When interviewed for ABC News by John Miller (1998), bin Ladin would not discuss these exploits. He simply stated that all Muslims are required to fight in the jihad.

The ISI was spreading the jihad. Bodansky argues that while watching the disputed Kashmir province (an area claimed by both India and Pakistan), leaders from the ISI were not content to limit their war to the Soviet Union. In 1986, the ISI began filtering some of the arms intended for the mujahadeen to Sikh terrorists in India. When this diversion was successful, the ISI began filtering arms and logistics to Muslim militants in Kashmir. Bodanksy says Shiite militants in Iran noticed the ISI actions and began to view the Afghan war as an expression of Islamic unity. In the meantime, Pakistan began to see itself as a leader in the pan-Arabic movement.

Things did not go as well for Azzam. When the Soviets were preparing to withdraw, the ISI created its own Afghan guerrilla force and used it to take control of major areas of Afghanistan. Azzam believed the United States was behind this action. Before he could take action on his own, he was killed in a terrorist attack by unknown assailants. Bin Ladin accepted the status quo and enjoyed warm relations with the ISI. He returned to Saudi Arabia after the war to resume his construction business.

The Saudi Arabian government was not to happy to see bin Ladin return. Not attractive to the Saudi royal family, bin Ladin was immensely popular with the people. Saudi Arabia is not an open democracy that tolerates diverse opinions and dissension, so bin Ladin's political activities were limited. He brought several mujahadeen-his "Afghans"-to Saudi Arabia with him and put them to work on construction projects. The Afghans had job security, and bin Ladin became independently wealthy.

The situation changed in 1990. Saudi Arabia houses two of the most holy shrines in Islam, the cities of Mecca and Medina. To millions of Muslims, including bin Ladin, these are sacred areas that must be protected by Muslims. This is considered holy ground. In 1990, Saddam Hussein, leader of Iraq, invaded Kuwait. The Saudi royal family appealed for help, and thousands of non-Muslim troops arrived in the holy land to fight Saddam Hussein. The American-led coalition called this military buildup "Desert Shield." When "Desert Shield" became "Desert Storm" in February 1991, radical Muslims were appalled to find Muslims fighting Muslims under American leadership. After the war, the Saudi government allowed American troops to be stationed in Saudi Arabia. This was too much for bin Ladin. He thought of declaring his own war.

Bodansky says bin Ladin was influenced by the pan-Islamic movement and the role of Iran. Putting aside differences between Shiites and Sunnis, radical Muslims found Satan arrayed against Islam; Satan came in the form of the United States. Bin Ladin worked with the Iranians to bring eschatological Sunnis and Shiites together in an organization called the International Muslim Brotherhood, but he wanted to go further. By April, he was training and financing terrorist groups and calling for the overthrow of unsympathetic Muslim governments.

PBS Front Line (1998) says these actions brought a Saudi crackdown, and bin Ladin was forced to flee. He first went to Afghanistan and then to Sudan. Bodansky states bin Ladin found friends in the radical government of Sudan, and he expanded his operations. By the end of 1992, bin Ladin had nearly 500 Afghans working for businesses that he established in Sudan. He also saw internationalism as the best means for striking the United States, and he refused to base his operations in any single country. In December 1992, a bomb exploded in a hotel in Yemen, a hotel that had been housing American troops. Front Line says U.S. intelligence linked the attack to bin Ladin.

DECLARING WAR ON THE UNITED STATES

Osama bin Ladin redefined the meaning of terrorism in the modern world. To understand this, it is helpful to compare his movement to the Palestinian movement. The PLO tried to become a state military organization, and it failed. It first operated in Jordan, then Lebanon, then Tunisia, and finally it renounced terrorism. Violence could only be carried out by splinter criminal groups on a subnational level, and these groups could not be controlled by the PLO. Abu Nidal's version of terrorism, on the other hand, used multiple support bases for Palestinian radicals. Instead of becoming a state, he moved within many states with many different types of organizations, eventually hiring out his terrorists to state supporters. Osama bin Ladin differs in his approach from both forms of violence. With the wealth of his construction empire as backing, bin Ladin transcended the state and operated on his own.

Yael Shahar (1998) argues bin Ladin's entrepreneurial efforts give him the freedom to finance and command his own terror network. His connections with his Afghans and his reputation as a warrior give him legitimacy. Bin Ladin does not need a government to support his operations. He has the money, personnel, material, and infrastructure necessary to maintain a campaign of terrorism. He only needs a place to hide.

According to Front Line, bin Ladin went on the offensive in 1993. Using his contacts in Sudan, he began searching for weapons of mass destruction. His Afghans sought to purchase nuclear weapons from underground sources in the Russian Federation, and he began work on a chemical munitions plant in Sudan. Bodansky says he also sent terrorists to fight in other parts of the world. Bin Ladin's Afghans went to Algeria, Egypt, Bosnia, Pakistan, Somalia, Kashmir, and Chechnya. U.S. intelligence sources also believe they came to the United States, and they linked him to the 1993 World Trade Center bombing.

Bin Ladin was active in Somalia when American troops joined an endemic civil war to bring food to the area. In October 1993, a U.S. Army Black Hawk helicopter was downed while on patrol in Mogadishu. U.S. Army Rangers went to the rescue, and a two-day battle ensued in which 18 Americans lost their lives. In an interview with ABC News's John Miller, bin Ladin claimed he trained and supported the troops that struck the Americans.

Bin Ladin was also involved in assassination attempts. In 1993, his Afghans tried to murder Prince Abdullah of Jordan. In 1995, U.S. intelligence sources believe he was behind the attempted assassination of Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak. According to Front Line, bin Ladin called for a guerrilla campaign against Americans in Saudi Arabia in 1995.

Bombing also entered bin Ladin's arsenal of mayhem. In 1995, his Afghans killed five American service personnel and two Indian soldiers with a truck bombing in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. In 1996, he struck in Dharan, killing 19 Americans with another truck bomb. Bin Ladin called his group of Afghans, al-Qaeda or The Base.

Bin Ladin followed these actions by calling for a holy war against the United States and its allies. In 1996, Osama bin Ladin officially "declared war" on the United States. He followed this by two religious rulings, called fatwas, in 1998. Magnus Ranstorp (1998) argues these writings reveal quite a bit about the nature of al-Qaeda and bin Ladin. First, bin Ladin represents a new phase in Middle Eastern terrorism. He is intent on spreading the realm of Islam with a transnational group. Second, he uses Islam to call for religious violence. Bin Ladin is a self-trained religious fanatic ready to kill in the name of God. Finally, bin Ladin wants to bring death. Whether with conventional weapons or weapons of mass destruction, bin Ladin's purpose is to kill. In his fatwa of February 1998, he calls for the killing of any American anywhere in the world.

In August 1998, bin Ladin's terrorists were behind two horrendous attacks in Africa, bombing the American embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. The Nairobi bomb killed 213 people and injured 4,500. The Dar es Salaam explosion killed 12 and wounded 85. An FBI investigative report gives an indication of bin Ladin's methods.

BIN LADIN'S BOMBINGS

Bombing has been one of Osama bin Ladin's primary terrorist tactics. He has been linked to the 1993 New York City World Trade Center bombing, a bombing in Kuwait, and three bombings targeting American military personnel. Despite his involvement in murder, no one was prepared for the attacks he launched on August 7, 1998. Bin Ladin's attacks in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam drew the attention of the world.

According to the FBI (2000), Osama bin Ladin and Mohammed Atef began planning an East African operation against the United States after American intervention in Somalia in 1992 and 1993. Atef, who runs the military and training wing of al-Qaeda, began building an infrastructure for a terrorist bombing in Kenya about 1994, with the assistance of Wadih El-Hage, an American citizen from Texas. Another group under the leadership of Abu Ubaida, one of bin Ladin's associates, established a base in Tanzania. Both groups purchased houses with a large garage and a high fence surrounding the property. Both of these bases served to hide the activities of the terrorists.

In Nairobi, the terrorists assembled a team, including a military leader, bomb technicians, truck drivers, and weapons specialists. The initial plan was to attack the embassy with a truck and two terrorists. One terrorist was to frighten Kenyans away from the perimeter of the embassy building, while the other was to drive the bomb-laden truck inside. The primary explosive agent was TNT. When the truck approached, the driver and his assistant found the driveway blocked. The assistant fled the scene, while the driver committed suicide by detonating the bomb. The terrorist succeeded in creating much property damage, but the human carnage was horrific. Although bin Ladin's terrorists wanted to murder Americans, they managed to kill or maim most of the Kenyans who happened to be passing by the embassy, only killing a few Americans.

A similar team was assembled in Tanzania, except the plan called for a single suicide bomber. Once again, the team used a house surrounded by a privacy fence to plan the attack. The terrorists made no attempt to warn Tanzanians in the area. Shortly after the attack in Nairobi, a single terrorist drove a truck loaded with explosives to the U.S. embassy in Dar es Salaam and detonated the bomb. This time bin Ladin's group only murdered Tanzanians. No Americans were killed.

The ambiguity of American counterterrorist policy emerged in the wake of the bombing. Was this a military matter, or should it be handled as a breach of international law? The United States responded in two ways. First, FBI antiterrorist task forces composed of federal agents, state, and local police officers went to both scenes. In the subsequent investigation, two arrests were made and a fuller picture of al-Qaeda began to emerge. Task force investigators testified before a federal grand jury and arrest warrants were issued for bin Ladin, Atef, and other members of al-Qaeda.

President Clinton, however, had another response as well. Armed with intelligence of possible locations of bin Ladin's bases, and with possible evidence of chemical weapons production in Sudan, Clinton ordered a cruise missile attack against selected targets. The missiles destroyed a factory in Sudan, although subsequent reports questioned the material being produced there, and missiles also landed on six bases in Afghanistan. Bin Ladin escaped. Critics claimed these actions were designed to divert attention from Clinton's impending impeachment trial. Regardless, the cruise missiles symbolized a substantial departure from the antiterrorism task force's legalistic approach to the bombings.

Bin Ladin remains popular among Muslim radicals. He has established links with Egyptian terrorist groups and has sent his Afghans to many different countries. In June 2000, his followers began launching suicide bombings against Russian soldiers in Chechnya. Ranstorp (1998) argues bin Ladin will eventually tumble because his theological tirades do not reflect the basis of Islam. He is theologically untrained and does not enjoy the support of Muslim clerics. However, he will continue terrorist operations, and American planners need to ask the question: Do we handle bin Ladin as a military or law enforcement problem?

B. A Sociolo